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SUMMARY
The major objective of the separation of powers is to preserve
liberty and prevent oppression. The means for achieving this ob-
jective are twofold: First, each branch is limited in its power on
the basis of function and second, each branch is required to
check and balance the others in the cause of liberty. On the
whole, the U.S. Supreme Court probably has accomplished these
purposes with two major exceptions. First, the Court has strayed
from its role as interpreter by imposing affirmative mandates on
the legislative and executive branches. Second, in contemporary
years, the Court has failed to protect economic liberty, a matter of
vital concern both to the individual and society. This article dis-
cusses the latter problem from the perspective of a separatist con-
stitution and explains the necessity and desirability of a change in
the judicial policy.
INTRODUCTION
During the initial forty years of this century, the Supreme
Court construed the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Constitution as securing economic liberties-those liberties
relating to the production and distribution of goods and services.'
In the late 1930s, the Court reversed these decisions, largely elimi-
nating the, protections they provided for the exercise of these
liberties.2 The meaning of two clauses are not dispositive of the
issue, however. Even assuming the validity of these reversals, the
result is inconsistent with a major rationale for the Constitution's
separation of powers principle-that the separation system is in-
tended to limit the power of government to oppress the people.
Since their early years, American courts, including the Su-
preme Court, have struck down measures they deemed oppressive,
notwithstanding a lack of textual basis for such action. The separa-
tion of government powers not only made this practice possible
but also required it as means of implementing checks and balanc-
es to preserve freedom. In contemporary times, producers and
distributors of goods and services have not benefitted from this
jurisprudence. This article examines the separation of powers as it
1 1. See generaly BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1981).
2 Id. at 184-203.
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applies to restrictive economic laws that are not invalid under any
other constitutional provision. My conclusion is that if these mea-
sures are arbitrary or capricious they are no less vulnerable to
judicial review under the separation principle than any other op-
pressive legislation.
This position is consistent with the Framers' concerns; they
greatly feared legislative bodies and sought to limit their powers.
Thus, in his discussion of the separation of powers doctrine, James
Madison observed "that the people ought to indulge all their jeal-
ousy and exhaust all their precautions" against the enterprising
ambition of the legislature. "The legislative department," warned
Madison, "is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and
drawing all power into its impetuous vortex."3 Many other Framers
were of similar opinion.'
This concern has not dissipated. Nevertheless, for all practical
purposes, the Supreme Court does not exercise review over eco-
nomic regulation. In few areas in contemporary years have the
holdings been more consistent. Overturning existing precedents,
the Court in 1938 held that economic regulation
is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in light of the
facts made known or generally assumed it is of such character
as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational
basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.5
Fifty-five years later in FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., the
Court reiterated that economic legislation will be upheld against
an equal protection challenge "if there is any reasonably conceiv-
able state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classi-
fication."6 Challengers have the burden "to negative every conceiv-
able basis which might support it."'
"This standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint,"
wrote Justice Clarence Thomas for a unanimous court in Beach
Communications.' Justice Thomas went on to quote Vance v. Bradley.
The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer
antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be recti-
3 THE FEDERALiST No. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
4 See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
5 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
6 113 S. C. 2096, 2101 (1993).
7 Id. at 2102 (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364
(1973)).
8 Id. at 2101.
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fled by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is
generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a
political branch has acted.9
In a nation that harbors considerable cynicism, if not great
distrust, for political processes, such views are not very persuasive.
The fact that a tyrant's powers are limited in time does not re-
move the harm caused in the interim. Judicial restraint is not a
virtue when it permits either of the elected branches to exercise
unlimited power over the people's liberties; judicial review is in-
tended as a remedy for the problem of political failure. Interest-
ingly, the Court rarely expresses confidence in the political process
when adjudicating cases involving speech, press, religion, or priva-
cy restraints; but seems not reluctant to voice confidence when
economic restrictions are challenged.
Separation of powers requires the judiciary to engage in seri-
ous inquiry about whether the legislature or executive has in-
fringed or denied liberty. As Justice Brandeis has explained: "The
doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the Convention
of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of
arbitrary power. The purpose was . . . to save the people from
autocracy."t" Under the separation of powers system, no branch
may oppress the people, and each branch has some authority over
other branches to prevent this from occurring. Government was
intended to function within these restraints. Indeed, Chief Justice
John Marshall asserted his Court "never sought to enlarge the
judicial power beyond its proper bounds, nor feared to carry it to
the fullest extent that duty required."'" I submit that the Court's
contemporary policy on economic regulation is contrary to its duty
to monitor the legislature.
The federal judiciary presently enforces enumerated liberties
and certain unenumerated ones. I assume for purposes of this
paper that no specific provision of the Constitution or any
unenumerated liberty secures economic activity. The question
then, is whether the separation of powers doctrine by itself impos-
9 Id. (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
10 Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In practice
Brandeis did not always subscribe to this perspective. See, for example, his dissents in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) and New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), in both of which he sought to uphold stringent state
controls.
11 JAMES B. THAYER ET AL, JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND
FELIX FRANKFURTER ON JOHN MARSHALL 85 (1967).
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es a duty on the Supreme court to protect economic liberties. My
discussion is divided into six parts: First, the considerations and
concerns leading to the adoption of a separation of powers system;
second, the judiciary's duty to protect liberty; third, early judicial
decisions on the judicial responsibility to protect liberties; fourth,
contemporary judicial decisions expanding the judicial protection
of freedom; fifth, the Supreme Court's contemporary record on
economic liberties; and sixth, reasons for applying the separation
doctrine to economic liberties.
My position in this paper is different than the one I present-
ed in my book, Economic Liberties and the Constitution.2 In the
book, I concluded that the privileges and immunities, due process
and equal protection clauses each secured economic liberties. In
part my argument was based on the Constitution's protection of
economic activity as a natural right and parts of that argument ap-
pear in this paper. I did not consider the responsibility of the
judiciary pursuant to the separation doctrine to preserve liberty.
This presentation is concerned with the separation of powers limi-
tations on economic legislation and regulation.
I. CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS LEADING TO THE ADOPTION OF
A SEPARATION OF POWERS SYSTEM
A major objective both of England's unwritten constitution
and America's written one is to preserve liberty by denying govern-
ment the power to enact oppressive legislation. English speaking
people trace their liberties to the Magna Carta executed under
threat of force by King John in 1215. The Magna Carta did not
deprive the king and his agents of all powers but only of arbitrary
power over life, liberty and property." This understanding was se-
cured over the years by many acts of Parliament and by the judi-
ciary in the common law. With the advent of legislative supremacy,
the people believed that English custom and tradition would pro-
tect their liberties. As Supreme Court Justice Bradley once dramat-
ically explained: "England has no written constitution, it is true;
but it has an unwritten one, resting in the acknowledged, and
frequently declared, privileges of Parliament and the people, to
violate which in any material respect would produce a revolution
12 SIEGAN, supra note 1.
13 Bernard H. Siegan, Majorities May Limit the People's Liberties Only When Authorized to
Do So by the Constitution, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 309, 334-335 (1990).
1995]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
in an hour."4
The English solution was not acceptable in the New World.
When they became independent, individual states rejected the
English unitary system in favor of a separation system, making the
creation and enforcement of laws a shared responsibility for the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches. By the time the Consti-
tutional Convention of 1787 was convened, the principle of sepa-
rating government powers had long been established in North
America.
Framers of the state and national constitutions objected to
unitary government primarily in the belief that it was not consis-
tent with human liberty. They harbored serious apprehensions and
misgivings about government and insisted on dispersing and con-
fining it.
Recent historical analysis of the Revolutionary period is very
persuasive that the Colonists greatly feared and distrusted govern-
ment. In Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, historian Ber-
nard Bailyn discusses the philosophy of those who inspired the
Revolution. 5 He is convinced that fear of a comprehensive con-
spiracy against liberty lay at the heart of American Revolutionary
thought. For protection against this conspiracy, many looked for
guidance to the advocates of a new liberty that espoused natural
rights and sought elimination of institutions and practices that
harbored despotism. The key concepts were natural rights, the
contractual basis of government, the uniqueness of English liberty,
and the preservation of constitutions founded on dispersed author-
ity. Government was thought to be by its nature hostile to human
liberty and happiness and especially susceptible to corruption and
14 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 115 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
"But from 1689 onwards no King, not even George III in his youth, ever attempted to
govern without Parliament, or contrary to the votes of the House of Commons." GEORGE
MACAULAY TREVELYAN, A SHORTENED HISTORY OF ENGLAND 335 (1942).
In England, a simple majority of Parliament is capable, with the assent of the
Crown, of carrying out any constitutional change, however revolutionary, and the
House of Commons, in practice, has absorbed to itself all the main power in
the Constitution .... The Royal veto has become wholly obsolete. The Royal
power under all normal circumstances is exercised at the dictation of a ministry
which owes its being to the majority of the House of Commons ... . The
House of Lords has, it is true, greater power, and can still, by a suspensive veto,
delay great changes until they are directly sanctioned by the constituencies at an
election."
WILLIAM E.H. LEcKy, DEMOCRACY AND LIBERTY 56 (Liberty Classics 1981) (1896).
15 BERNARD BAiLYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967).
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despotism. Therefore, it should be confined to serve those needs
of the people that could not otherwise be satisfied.
The means for restricting governmental powers was through a
constitution, which would define authority and create a separation
and mixture of functions that would prevent any one group from
gaining ascendancy. Creating this balance of forces was essential to
preserve the capacity to exercise natural rights-those God-given,
inalienable, and indefeasible rights founded on immutable maxims
of reason and justice and inherent in all people by virtue of their
humanity. Those rights were expressed-not created-in the Eng-
lish common law, in the statutory enactments of parliament, and
in the charters and privileges promulgated by the Crown. Howev-
er, because not even these sources could exhaust the great trea-
sure of human rights, they delineated the minimum, not the maxi-
mum, boundary of liberty. Government had to be so constituted
that it could not infringe these rights, for the legitimacy of posi-
tive law rests on the degree to which it preserves human rights.
While the passions may have subsided and the explanations
become more pragmatic, these libertarian ideas were prominent
and influential during the time when the U.S. Constitution was
drafted and ratified. It is evident from the ratification debates that
the protection of the individual from government was then the
predominant political concern. Opponents of the proposed Con-
stitution displayed great apprehension and antagonism toward cen-
tralized government, while its supporters responded that the feder-
al government would have no more power than necessary to se-
cure the people from foreign and domestic perils. 6
A. Coke, Locke and Blackstone and Natural Rights
From the sixteenth through the eighteenth century, the natu-
ral law concept commanded a great deal of scholarly attention,
and by the time of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, a con-
siderable number of philosophers, ecclesiastical scholars, social
commentators, and jurists had written on the subject. All agreed
that people by reason of their humanity possessed natural rights
which could not be abridged by positive law. American constitu-
tional and bill of rights models were constructed at a time when
16 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBUC 1776-1787 at 9-
13 (1969); Gary J. Schmitt & Robert H. Webking, Revolutionaries, Antifederalists, and Feder-
alists: Comments on Gordon Wood's Understanding of the American Founding, 9 PoL. Sc. RE-
vIEWvER 195 (1979).
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the natural law school of judicial thought was highly influential.
The thinking of three very influential commentators provides
insight and perspective about how natural law and natural rights
were viewed by the political and judicial leaders of those times.
These commentators are Edward Coke (1552-1634),17 John Locke
(1632-1704), and William Blackstone (1723-1780).8 The Revolu-
tionary generations accepted much of Locke's political philosophy
and were committed to many legal doctrines espoused by Coke
and Blackstone.
Locke wrote that people sought the sanctuary of political
society because of the uncertain conditions existing in the state of
nature, in which everyone who lacked the physical power to de-
fend himself might be victimized by the unscrupulous and the evil.
In forming society, the people entered into a social compact,
defining the authority and purposes of government and relinquish-
ing many of their individual powers to the state, which then be-
came responsible for protecting life, personal liberties, and posses-
sions, all of which were included in the term "property." "The
great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into common-
wealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preser-
vation of their property; to which in the state of nature there are
many things wanting."19
The legislature, as the supreme body of the organized state,
must necessarily be limited in power, at least to the extent that
lawmakers could not impose conditions worse than those existing
in the state of nature. The legislature may not deprive the individ-
17 Coke's "influence, as the embodiment of the common law, was so strong that it
is useless to contend that he 'was either misled by his sources or consciously misinter-
preted them' for Coke's mistakes, it is said, are the common law." W.J. Brockelbank, The
Role of Due Process in American Constitutional Law, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 561, 562 (1954).
Throughout the Eighteenth Century, Coke was one of the most frequently cited legal
and political thinkers. Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 4 Wis. L. REV. 941,
959, 992 (1990).
18 Blackstone's Commentaries was "the first important and the most influential system-
atic statement of the principles of the common law. For generations of English lawyers, it
has been both the foremost coherent statement of the subject of their study, and the
citadel of their legal tradition. To lawyers on this side of the Atlantic, it has been even
more important. In the first century of American independence, the Commentaries were
not merely an approach to the study of law; for most lawyers they constituted all there
was of the law .... And many an early American lawyer might have said, with Chan-
cellor Kent, that 'he owed his reputation to the fact that when studying law . . . he had
but one book, Blackstone's Commentaries, but that one book he mastered.'" DANIEL J.
BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW 3 (1941) (quoting C. WARREN, HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN BAR 187 (1911)).
19 JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, SECOND ESSAY, § 124.
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ual of fundamental rights-first, because the social compact does
not provide government with this power, and second, because
government's purpose is to play a fiduciary role in safeguarding
and enhancing these rights.
[The legislative power] . . . is not nor can possibly be absolute-
ly arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people. For it
being but the joint power of every member of society given up
to that person, or assembly, which is legislator, it can be no
more than those persons had in a state of nature before they
entered into society, and gave it up to the community. For
nobody can transfer to another more power than he has in
himself; and nobody has an absolute arbitrary power over him-
self, or over any other to destroy his own life, or to take away
the life or property of another."
Limitations on governmental power are central to Locke's
thesis.
It cannot be supposed that they [individuals] should intend,
had they a power so to do, to give to any one, or more, an
absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates, and put
a force into the magistrate's hand to execute his unlimited will
arbitrarily upon them: This [would be] to put themselves into a
worse condition than the state of nature, wherein they had a
liberty to defend their right against the injuries of others, and
were upon equal terms of force to maintain it, whether invad-
ed by a single man or many in combination.2
When the government violated its limitations, the people
could rightfully disobey it or even revolt against it:
Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the Law be trans-
gressed to another's harm. And whosoever in Authority exceeds
the Power given him by the Law, and makes use of the Force
he has under his Command, to compass that upon the Subject,
which the Law allows not, ceases in that to be a Magistrate,
and acting without Authority, may be opposed, as any other
Man, who by force invades the Right of another .... 
[W]henever the legislators endeavor to take away, and destroy
the property of the people, or to reduce them to Slavery under
Arbitrary Power, they put themselves into a state of war with
the People, who are thereupon absolved from any farther Obe-
20 Id. § 135.
21 Id. § 137.
22 Id. § 202.
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dience .... By this breach of trust they forfeit the power, the
people had put into their hands, for quite contrary ends, and
it devolves to the people, who have a Right to resume their
original liberty ....
Coke offered a much less drastic remedy for the tyranny of
the legislature. He professed that the courts are empowered to
monitor and annul the legislature's actions. Judicial review can be
traced to his famous dictum in Dr. Bonham's Case, decided by the
court of common pleas in 1610. Coke ruled that the London Col-
lege of Physicians was not entitled, under an Act of Parliament, to
punish Bonham for practicing medicine without its license. Coke
declared:
And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common
law will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge
them to be utterly void; for when an Act of Parliament is
against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible
to be performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge
such an Act to be void.24
This dictum was used in America to support judicial oversight and
to justify resistance to the British Parliament and by jurists after
the Revolution as a basis for judicial review.
Bonham's Case was not an isolated event. In his Institutes, Coke
presented other instances of judicial power. Three cases illustrated
that adoption of a law or regulation by a governmental authority
did not necessarily make it the law of the land. The first con-
cerned a custom in a town that enabled the lord to occupy the
freehold of his tenant upon an arrearage in rent, and the second
concerned a charter granted by the king that allowed a corpora-
tion to confiscate cloth dyed with "logwood." No judicial process
was required in either prior to executing the claimed power. Each
claim of power was adjudged "against the law of the land." ' The
third case involved an ordinance by a company of merchant tailors
"having power by their charter to make ordinances" that restricted
the sellers from whom members could buy their clothes. This ordi-
nance was held to violate the law "because it was against the liber-
23 Id. § 222.
24 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (KB. 1610).
25 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 46 (1817). Plunknett cites
numerous instances when courts from the middle of the fourteenth century to Coke's
day ignored statutes of Parliament or disregarded their plain meaning. Theodore F.T.
Plunknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. REV. 30, 36 (1926).
[Vol. 70:3
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ty of the subject, for every subject [has] freedome to put his
clothes to be dressed by whom he will."26
Coke also wrote that the prohibition in the Magna Carta
against being disseised required that "[n]o man ought to be put
from his livelihood without answer,"27 meaning without proper
judicial process. Forfeiture of any protected interest could come
about only when its possessor is "brought in to answer[] . . . by
due process of the common law."2" Coke explains "process of the
law" as including "by indictment or presentment of good and
lawful men, where such deeds be done in due manner, or by writ
original[] of the common law."' Hence, the abridgement by the
king or other governmental authorities of life, liberty, or property
without the person being "brought in to answer" violated the re-
quired process of law. Coke's legal opinions and writings provided
a foundation for the creation of a system of limited government
under which the courts would be able to preserve the people's
liberties."0
Blackstone's Commentaries are not at variance with natural law
doctrine when viewed within the context of the American system.
He believed in the omnipotence of the British Parliament; 1 how-
26 1 COKE, supra note 25, at 47.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 50.
29 Id.
30
Prior to the 17th century, therefore, the English judicial tradition had often
tended to assign a subordinate role to the legislative function of King and Par-
liament, holding that the law was not created but ascertained or declared. Com-
mon law was fundamental law, and, although it could be complemented by the
legislator, it could not be violated by him; hence law was largely withdrawn from
arbitrary interventions of King and Parliament. This was the tradition Coke in-
herited and used as a weapon in his struggle against the exercise of arbitrary
power by King James I.
MAURO CAPPELLETrI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 36-37 (1971).
31 1 WILLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *156.
I lay down the rule with these restrictions; though I know it is generally laid
down more largely, that acts of parliament contrary to reason are void. But if
the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I
know of no power that can control it: and the examples usually alleged in sup-
port of this sense of the rule do none of them prove, that where the main
object of a statute is unreasonable the judges are at liberty to reject it; for that
were to set the judicial power above that of the legislature, which would be
subversive of all government. But where some collateral matter arises out of the
general words, and happens to be unreasonable; there the judges are in decency
to conclude that this consequence was not foreseen by the parliament, and
19951
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ever, his position on this issue has limited application to the
American constitutional system, under which legislative powers are
confined. His chapter, "Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals,"
holds that the legislature is not unlimited in its powers over the
absolute rights of life, liberty, and property. 2
Blackstone believed that the principal end of society is to
protect the enjoyment of these absolute rights, which were subject
only to "[r]estraints in themselves so gentle and moderate, as will
appear upon farther inquiry, that no man of sense or probity
would wish to see them slackened."33 If violated, the people were
entitled to vindicate these rights by first, seeking judicial relief;
second, petitioning the king and parliament; and last, using armed
force.'
Blackstone condemned laws as destructive of freedom that
were wanton and causeless restraints, "whether practiced by a
monarch, a nobility, or a popular assembly." 5 "[Tihat system of
laws, is alone calculated to maintain civil liberty, which leaves the
subject entire master of his own conduct, except in those points
wherein the public good requires some direction or restraint. " '
Accordingly, Locke, Coke and Blackstone agreed that legisla-
tors have no rightful authority to oppress the people, that is, to
burden the people with cruel or unjust impositions or restraints.
Absent from Blackstone's description of the just state was a
mechanism to limit legislative power. He extolled England as
the "only nation in the world, where political or civil liberty is the
direct end of it's [sic] constitution.""8 But Blackstone's observa-
tions were not very persuasive to people who had suffered under
the British system and distrusted government. The Americans
demanded a separation system to restrain government. As a promi-
nent American asserted, "[P] ower ought to have such checks and
limitations as to prevent bad men from abusing it. It ought to be
granted on a supposition that men will be bad; for it may be
therefore they are at liberty to expound the statute by equity, and only quoad
hoc disregard it.
1 id. at *91.
32 1 id. at *119-25.
33 1 i& at *140.
34 Id.
35 1 idi at *122.
36 Id.
37 However, Blackstone viewed the courts as a protector of liberty. 1 id. at *140.




The Declaration of Independence incorporates the ideas of
Locke, Coke and Blackstone. Governments are instituted, accord-
ing to the Declaration, to secure life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness. Laws that prohibit the attainment of each are illegiti-
mate. Such laws are moral nullities. It follows that judicial inter-
vention is required to make them legal nullities.
In the ratification debates on the proposed Constitution, the
amount of power accorded the branches was a matter of contro-
versy. The Anti-Federalists attacked the proposed Constitution as
containing provisions that vested Congress and the President with
excessive powers. But the objective of limited government was not
an issue. As Professor Storing explains, if the Federalists and Anti-
Federalists were divided among themselves, they were, at a deeper
level, united with one another about confining government pow-
ers.
Their disagreements were not based on different premises
about the nature of man or the ends of political life. They
were not the deep cleavages of contending regimes. They were
the much less sharp and clear-cut difference within the family,
as it were, of men agreed that the purpose of government is
the regulation and thereby the protection of individual rights
and that the best instrument for this purpose is some form of
limited, republican government.4°
B. Madison's Strong Support for Separation of Powers
The leading theoretician among the Framers on the subject of
separation of powers was James Madison. In replying to the Anti-
Federalists' concerns about excessive government powers in the
proposed Constitution, Madison devoted five Federalist Papers to
discussing and explaining the Constitution's separatist powers. 1
The separation of powers consisted of two parts: first, the division
of functions; and second, the checks and balances held by each
branch with respect to the others. Responding to attacks on the
proposed Constitution, Madison asserted: "Were the federal Consti-
tution, therefore, really chargeable with this accumulation of pow-
39 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 563 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1901) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DE-
BATES] (quoting William Grayson).
40 HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 3 (1981).
41 THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47-51.
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er, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous tendency to
such an accumulation, no further arguments would be necessary
to inspire universal reprobation of the system."' An opponent of
majority rule, Madison extolled the separation principle: "No polit-
ical truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with
the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty ....
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judi-
ciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.'
Protection of the separation principle would not only be ac-
complished by the legal text but also by "so contriving the interior
structure of the government as that its several constituent parts
may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each
other in their proper places."4"
But the great security against a gradual concentration of
the several powers in the same department consists in giving to
those who administer each department the necessary constitu-
tional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of
the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all
other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack.
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest
of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of
the place .... In framing a government which is to be admin-
istered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you
must first enable the government to control the governed; and
in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on
the people is no doubt, the primary control on the govern-
ment; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of
auxiliary precautions.46
Under separation, government power would be used to con-
trol government power. As previously noted, Madison was particu-
larly concerned about legislative excesses.47 "In republican govern-
ment the legislative authority necessarily predominates."' And the
experience in this regard had been very poor. The legislature "was
42 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 THE FEDERAliST No. 51, at 320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
46 Id. at 321-22.
47 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
48 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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the real source of danger to the American Constitution [necessitat-
ing] giving every defensive authority to the other departments that
was consistent with republican principles."49 Madison rejected ma-
jority rule as a matter of principle. "In fact, it is only re-establish-
ing, under another name and more specious form, force as a
matter of right."' In a letter to Jefferson, he asserted that the
invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended "from acts
in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major
number of the constituents."!"
According the legislature unlimited power, Madison wrote,
violated a fundamental principle of a free society:
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, be-
cause his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not
improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater
reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties
at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts
of legislation but so many judicial determinations, not indeed
concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the
rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different
classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes
which they determine? 2
In his Farewell Address, President George Washington lauded
the separation of powers and urged the country to reject consoli-
dation of powers since it would create "a real despotism."
But let there be no change [by] usurpation; for though this, in
one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the custom-
ary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The
precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil
any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time
yield."3
There are numerous provisions in the U.S. Constitution that
are intended to be used by the branches to confine the exercise
of government power. The objective is to secure what the Pream-
ble refers to as "the blessings of liberty." This, after all, is the basis
49 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 74 (Max Fan-and ed.,
1911) [hereinafter FARRAND'S RECORDS].
50 THE FORGING OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM: SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 45
(Saul K Padover ed., 1965) [hereinafter FORGING OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM].
51 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 1 BERNARD
SCIVARTZ, TE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 616 (1971).
52 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
53 SOL BLOOM, THE STORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 141 (1937).
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for the rejection of unitary government, as Chief Justice Warren
Burger explained in a contemporary decision:
The choices we discern as having been made in the Con-
stitutional Convention impose burdens on governmental pro-
cesses that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but
those hard choices were consciously made by men who had
lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary
governmental acts to go unchecked .... With all the obvious
flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not
yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the
exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints
spelled out in the Constitution.'
Measures that are oppressive are outside of the government's
authority since, to borrow from Locke, "by their breach of Trust
they forfeit the power, the people had put in their hands, for
quite contrary ends."" In addition, limiting government power is
pragmatically rewarding for it enables and encourages the people,
as the primary source of creativity, innovation and productivity, to
advance the society.56
Madison supported separation in part because of his serious
doubts about the wisdom of government. Madison was not dis-
turbed that separation would impede governmental finality and
cause deadlock (now referred to as "gridlock") among the branch-
es. As the following quotations concerning the commercial area il-
lustrate, he was a great proponent of individual liberty both for
philosophical and pragmatic reasons:
Government is instituted to protect property of every sort;
as well as that which lies in the various rights of individuals, as
that which the term particularly expresses. This being the end
of government, that alone is a just government, which impartial-
ly secures to every man, whatever is his own ......
That is not a just government, nor is property secure un-
der it, where arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies
deny to part of its citizens that free use of their faculties, and
free choice of their occupations, which not only constitute
54 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
55 LOCKE, supra note 19.
56 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (1937). Originally published in 1776, this work considerably influenced thinking
of this character during the American revolutionary and constitutional periods.




their property in the general sense of the word; but are the
means of acquiring property strictly so called.. .. '
I own myself the friend to a very free system of com-
merce, and hold it as a truth, that commercial shackles are
generally unjust, oppressive, and unpolitic; it is also a truth,
that if industry and labor are left to take their own course,
they will generally be directed to those objects which are the
most productive, and this is a more certain and direct manner
than the wisdom of the most enlightened Legislature could
point out. 9
C.' The Framers Sought to Limit Legislatures
A person holding such beliefs is not likely to favor unlimited
power for the legislature. My reading of the discussions at the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 does not suggest Madison's
views on property and economic well-being differed substantially
from many other delegates.
Madison was far from alone in fearing majoritarian power.
James Wilson, an influential Framer, observed that after the de-
struction of royal supremacy in England, "a more pure and un-
mixed tyranny sprang up in the parliament than had been exer-
cised by the monarch. " ' Other Framers were apprehensive about
lawmakers. Hamilton condemned the state legislatures for failing
to safeguard commercial rights.6 1 Gouverneur Morris found in ev-
ery state legislative department "excesses [against] personal liberty
private property [and] personal safety,"62 and Edmund Randolph
presented the Virginia Plan to the Convention to overcome the
"turbulence and follies of democracy."6
Hamilton described the dangers an unlimited legislature
posed for a society:
Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses
of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular
and violent propensities? Is it not well known that their deter-
minations are often governed by a few individuals in whom
they place confidence and are, of course, liable to be tinctured
58 Id. at 268.
59 Id. at 269 (First Congress, April 9, 1789).
60 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrrUTION 323 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987).
61 THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 65 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
62 1 FARRAND'S REcoRDs, supra note 49, at 512.
63 1 id. at 51.
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by the passions and views of those individuals?'
Only the judiciary was in a position to secure the Constitu-
tion.
The complete independence of the courts of justice is
peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited con-
stitution, I understand one which contains certain specified
exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as
that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and
the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice
no other way than through the medium of the courts of jus-
tice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the
manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the
reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to
nothing.'
Hamilton declared that the judiciary would never endanger
the liberty of the people "so long as the judiciary remains truly
distinct from both the legislature and the executive. For I agree
that 'there is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated
from the legislative and executive powers.'"'
Accordingly, under the U.S. Constitution, the legislature is the
agent for authority and the judiciary the agent for liberty. The leg-
islature equates the public interest with the creation of laws, the
judiciary with the preservation of liberty. Errors occur: There is no
power that is not liable to abuse. In the words of Justice Joseph
Story:
It is always a doubtful course, to argue against the use or exis-
tence of a power, from the possibility of its abuse .... From
the very nature of things, the absolute right of decision, in the
last resort, must rest somewhere-wherever it may be vested it
is susceptible of abuse.67
Assuming the objective is liberty, errors and abuses by the legisla-
ture are less tolerable than those by the judiciary. Failings on the
part of the legislature usually enlarge authority, while those by the
judiciary mostly remove authority.' An early American empha-
64 THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at 56-57 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
65 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
66 Id. (quoting I MONTESQUIEU, SPIRrr oF LAWs 181 (1748)).
67 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 344-45 (1816).
68 However, a major shortcoming of the Supreme Court in recent years has been its
failure to apply the separation principle to its own exercise of power. As I have previ-
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sized the difference in the responsibility.
Different abilities are necessary for the making, judging, and
executing of laws. They require the exercise of different pow-
ers, faculties, and knowledge. No one man ever had a sufficient
extent of abilities, or versatility of genius, to attend to the du-
ties of all, at one time, or in a quick succession. Such a union
must frequently occasion a confusion of principles, and remedi-
less violation of rights.'
Limiting the legislature could hardly have been a difficult
proposition for the Framers who in keeping with the general con-
sensus of the time were strongly supportive of property rights. At
the Constitutional Convention, Gouverneur Morris explained prop-
erty ownership in Lockean terms:
Life and liberty were generally said to be of more value, than
property. An accurate view of the matter would nevertheless
prove that property was the main object of Society. The savage
state was more favorable to liberty than the Civilized; and suffi-
ciently so to life. It was preferred by all men who had not
acquired a taste for property; it was only renounced for the
sake of property which could only be secured by the restraints
of regular government 70
As previously reported, James Madison was of similar mind. During
the Convention, he said that in civilized communities the preserva-
ously observed:
The Supreme Court says the nicest things about the division of powers principle,
and sternly lectures the other branches to observe it. When we measure this in-
spiring rhetoric against the Court's own performance, the record is not very in-
spiring. In many of the most important controversies of the times-when the ob-
servance of law is most acute-the Court has usurped powers reserved to the
federal or state legislatures.
Bernard H. Siegan, Separation of Powers and other Divisions of Authority under the Constitution,
23 SuFFoLK U. L Ray. 1, 14 (1989).
As a result of such judicial errors, many conservatives have become quite hostile to
judicial power in the constitutional area. In advocating a lesser role for the judiciary,
however, they are seeking to curtail the separation of powers, which is at the core of the
American constitutional system. The problem lies in the judiciary dispensing positive man-
dates and has less to do with its veto powers. According legislators total authority would
hardly serve the cause of liberty.
69 Nathaniel Chipman, Sketches of the Principles of Government (1793), reprinted in 1
THE FouNDERs' CONSTTUTION, supra note 60, at 332-33. Hamilton observed that if society
is prone to distrust the judiciary, it should also strip the judges of their power over statu-
tory interpretation. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
70 1 FARRAND'S REcORDS, supra note 49, at 533-34.
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tion of property, as well as personal rights, was an essential object
of the law.7' Later, he wrote that the protection of the "faculties
of men, from which the rights of property originate," is the first
object of government.72 Madison voiced apprehensions about
what would occur in the absence of such protections:
An increase of population will of necessity increase the propor-
tion of those who will labour under all the hardships of life,
secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings.
These may in time outnumber those who are placed above the
feelings of indigence. According to the equal laws of suffrage,
the power will slide into the hands of the former. No agrarian
attempts have yet been made in this Country, but symptoms of
a leveling spirit ... have sufficiently appeared in certain quar-
ters to give notice of the future danger."
At the Convention, other delegates emphasized property
rights. Rufus King of Massachusetts and John Rutledge of South
Carolina agreed with Morris and Madison that the protection of
property was the primary or principal object of society. 4 Pierce
Butler of South Carolina contended that "property was the only
just measure of representation. This was the great object of Gov-
ern[men] t: the great cause of war, the great means of carrying it
on."75 William R. Davie of North Carolina, Abraham Baldwin of
Georgia, and Charles Pinckney of South Carolina thought the
Senate should represent property or wealth. George Mason of
Virginia stated that an important objective in constituting a Senate
was to secure the right of property.' John Dickinson of Delaware
considered freeholders as the best guarantors of society.77 Hamil-
ton said that inequality in property ownership should not cause
the society to abridge liberty. "The differences in wealth are al-
ready great among us, nothing like equality of property exists.
Inequality will exist as long as liberty exists, and it unavoidably
results from that very liberty itself."79
71 1 id. at 450.
72 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
73 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 49, at 422-23 (1937).
74 1 id. at 533-34.
75 1 id. at 541-42.
76 1 id. at 469-70, 528, 542.
77 2 id. at 202.
78 3 id. at 110.




As the architects of a free society, the Framers understood
that it could not exist unless government is prohibited from con-
fiscating private property. If government can seize something
owned by a private citizen, it can exert enormous power over
people. As Hamilton stated, "a power over a man's subsistence
amounts to a power over his will.""0 Likewise, individual invest-
ment and saving would be insecure. Ownership and investment,
upon which the economy depends, would be in jeopardy if the
legislature was not deprived of confiscatory powers."'
Hence, the viability of the national government the Framers
contemplated required that the legislature's powers over property
be substantially limited. This view obviously was not confined to
the property right. According to Charles Grove Haines, in his
authoritative work on judicial review, a commonly held belief in
1787 was that the greatest peril to liberty comes from the expand-
ing powers of legislative bodies:
[T]here was more concern as to the restrictions under which
governments should operate than as to the functions to be
performed. Governments were to be prohibited from interfer-
ing with freedom of person, security of property, freedom of
speech and of religion. The guaranty of liberty was, therefore,
to give the rulers as little power as possible and then to sur-
round them with numerous restrictions-to balance power
against power.
8 2
Nevertheless, the original constitution contained no bill of rights
to protect the people from oppression by government. The Fram-
ers believed such provisions unnecessary and undesirable, as will
80 THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
81 "The principle established by the Magna Carta and thus basic to the common law
and later to the Constitution was the identification of liberty and property. Ownership of
property was evidence of liberty. In solemn ceremony, it was there decreed that neither
the King nor government could take property except per /egem terrae ... .To the fram-
ers, identifying property with freedom meant that if you could own property, you were
free." Norman Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to Lochner, 17 Sw. U. L. REV. 627,
637-38 (1988) (footnotes omitted). There are two explanations for the absence of specific
protection for property in the original Constitution. First, the right of property is a natu-
ral right which government had no power to deny or disparage. See Douglas Kmiec, The
Coherence of the Natural Law of Property, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 367 (1991). Second, the ex
post facto clauses in Article I, Sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution protect a property
owner from diminution or deprivation of his property interests. SIEGAN, supra note 1, at
67-82.
82 CHARLEs GROVE HAINEs, THE AMERICAN DOCIUNE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 209-10
(1959).
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be explained in the next section. In Alexander Hamilton's opin-
ion, "the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every
useful purpose, A Bill of Rights."83
II. THE JUDICIARY'S DUTY TO PROTECT LIBERTY
The Federalists maintained that the national government had
no power to deprive people of their liberties. Their approach to
protecting individual liberty and local powers was to limit the
powers of the national government. Madison explained in The
Federalist No. 45:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
federal government are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.
The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as
war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; .... The
powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the
objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the
lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.'
Madison considered that the operations of the national gov-
ernment would be "most extensive and important in times of war
and danger; those of the State Governments in times of peace and
security."85 As a result of this division of powers, the state govern-
ments generally would be more important than the federal govern-
ment.
The Anti-federalists were not convinced; they viewed with
alarm the national supremacy power in Article VI and the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause at the end of Article I, Section 8. Both
Hamilton and Madison emphatically rejected their claims. These
provisions, Hamilton wrote, were "the source of much virulent
invective and petulant declamation against the proposed Constitu-
tion."86 He and Madison explained that the provisions did not
increase the government's powers but were merely declaratory of
what would have resulted by unavoidable implication, as the ap-
propriate and technical means of executing the enumerated pow-
83 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 515 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
84 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-23 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
85 Id. at 293.






Because the powers of the national government were so limit-
ed, they argued, the people had little to fear that their liberties
would be denied. The Constitution's terms and provisions support
this view. "To preserve innumerably many rights from the power
of the federal government-to avoid limiting freedom to such
rights as could be listed-the framers left most rights to be de-
fined by the enumeration of federal powers. " ' It was therefore
essential that the Bill of Rights to be appended to the Constitu-
tion contain a provision securing unenumerated rights. The Ninth
Amendment serves this purpose.
In practice, the major restraint on government authority is
the judiciary. The question arises as to how much power the Su-
preme Court actually possesses in the protection of liberty. Was it
confined to the text of the Constitution or could the Court go
beyond the text for this purpose? The separation of powers con-
cept provided the judiciary with two justifications for following the
latter course. First, determining the powers of the various branch-
es is a matter of interpretation, a judicial function. Second, the
judiciary has a duty to check the other branches to preserve liber-
ty-
In The Federalist No. 78, Hamilton spelled out an answer to
the above inquiry. Not only was the judiciary the guardian of the
stated liberties, which were very few at the time, but also of others
not stated. Hamilton asserted the judiciary had an obligation to
preserve liberty that was not identified in the Constitution:
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to
guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the
effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing men, or
the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate
among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily
give place to better information, and more deliberate reflec-
tion, have a tendency, in the mearntime, to occasion dangerous
innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the
minor party in the community...
But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution
only that the independence of the judges may be an essential
87 See THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 44 (James Madison); see
also Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power A Jurisdictional
Interpretation of the Sweeping Claus 43 DUKE LJ. 267 (1993).
88 Philip A. Hamburger, Trivial Rights, 70 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 7 (1994).
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safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the
society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the injury
of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust
and partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial magis-
tracy is of vast importance in mitigating the severity and confin-
ing the operation of such laws. 9
Thus, under Hamilton's analysis, the Supreme Court is em-
powered to "mitigat[e] the severity and confin[e] the operation"
of "unjust and partial laws" as well as to protect against "danger-
ous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the
minor party in the community."' Finality over unjust and oppres-
sive measures rests with the judiciary and not the legislature. By
this measure, the Court could invalidate those legislative measures
condemned by Blackstone ("wanton and causeless" restraints) and
Coke (laws "against common right and reason")." Hamilton be-
lieved that
[i]n the form of this government, and in the mode of legisla-
tion, you find all the checks which the greatest politicians and
the best writers have ever conceived .... This organization is
so complex, so skillfully contrived, that it is next to impossible
that an impolitic or wicked measure should pass the scrutiny
with success.92
Hamilton believed in natural rights and his strong endorse-
ment of the proposed Constitution suggests that it was satisfactory
in this respect. He wrote in 1774: "The sacred rights of mankind
are not to be rummaged for, among old parchments, or musty
records. They are written, as with a sun beam, in the whole volume
of human nature, by the hand of the divinity itself; and can never
be erased or obscured by mortal power."93
Subsequently in 1796, Hamilton in his capacity as a private
attorney wrote an opinion that natural law was a decisive consider-
ation in determining whether good faith purchasers of land were
protected under the Constitution from the Georgia legislature's at-
tempt to revoke their titles:
89 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469-70 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
90 Id.
91 See supra notes 17-18, 31 and accompanying text.
92 2 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 39, at 348.
93 Alexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted, &c., in 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 81, 122 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961).
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Without pretending to judge of the original merits or demerits
of the purchasers, it may be safely said to be a contravention
of the first principles of natural justice and social policy, with-
out any judicial decision of facts, by a positive act of the legis-
lature, to revoke a grant of property regularly made for valu-
able consideration, under legislative authority, to the prejudice
even of third persons on every supposition innocent of the
alleged fraud or corruption ....
In his writings in The Federalist, Madison does not discuss spe-
cifically the judiciary as the protector of individual rights. He ex-
plained in his discussion of the Necessary and Proper Clause that
the executive and judiciary departments would restrain legislative
usurpations:
If it be asked what is to be the consequence, in case the
Congress shall misconstrue this part of the Constitution [Neces-
sary and Proper Clause] and exercise powers not warranted by
its true meaning, I answer the same as if they should miscon-
strue or enlarge any other power vested in them;.., the
same, in short, as if the State legislatures should violate their
respective constitutional authorities. In the first instance, the
success of the usurpation will depend on the executive and
judiciary departments, which are to expound and give effect to
the legislative acts; and in the last resort a remedy must be
obtained from the people, who can, by the election of more
faithful representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers."
Madison did not define usurpation. It surely meant violation
of constitutional terms and provisions. It also included violation of
natural rights. Since the major protection for liberty in the origi-
nal constitution was the limitation of powers, government's cur-
tailing of a natural right usually was a usurpation of power. In The
Federalist No. 44, Madison displayed his belief in natural rights
doctrine:
Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the
obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of
the social compact and to every principle of sound legislation.
The two former are expressly prohibited by the declarations
prefixed to some of the State constitutions, and all of them are
94 BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 22 (1938)
(opinion of Hamilton). The opinion related to the matter subsequently litigated in
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
95 THE FEDERAULST No. 44, at 285-86 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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prohibited by the spirit and scope of these fundamental char-
ters.
96
As would be expected from the earlier discussion, the natural
law perspective existed at the Constitutional Convention. When the
prohibitions on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws were in-
troduced, Oliver Ellsworth, a Connecticut delegate who later be-
came Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, argued that these
protections were superfluous, contending that "there were no
lawyer, no civilian who would not say that ex post facto laws were
void of themselves."97 James Wilson, who also later served on the
Supreme Court, likewise opposed inserting the prohibitions, ex-
plaining that "[i]t will bring reflections on the Constitution-and
proclaim that we are ignorant of the first principles of Legislation,
or are constituting a Government which will be so. "18 As a mem-
ber of the first Congress, Framer Roger Sherman drafted a pro-
posed bill of rights which was recently discovered. It contained the
following "natural rights" provision: "The people have certain natu-
ral rights which are retained by them when they enter into Soci-
ety." He then went on to name them (religion, property, ex-
pression, assembly, and so on), and concluded: "Of these rights
therefore they shall not be deprived by the Government of the
United States."100
In presenting amendments to the Constitution in the First
Congress (of which he was a member)-that would be adopted
subsequently as the Bill of Rights-Madison explained the role of
the judiciary in guaranteeing them:
If [these amendments] are incorporated into the Constitution,
independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a
peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the
legislative or Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every
encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Con-
stitution by the declaration of rights. 1
96 Id. at 282. The clauses were inserted according to Madison, because "[o]ur own
experience has taught us ... that additional fences against these dangers ought not to
be omitted." Id.
97 2 FARRAND'S REcORDS, supra note 49, at 376.
98 Id.
99 DAVID GRUMP ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 520 (1989).
100 Id.
101 1 CONG. DEB. 456 (1834) (Speech of James Madison). This passage follows the
ones quoted in the text accompanying the next two footnotes in which Madison refers to
protecting unspecified rights, supporting the conclusion that he looked to the judiciary to
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Congressman Madison sought extensive protections for liberty,
beyond those rights enumerated. He expressed concern that a bill
of rights might not protect all of the people's liberties:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enu-
merating particular* exceptions to the grant of power, it would
disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumera-
tion; and it might follow, by implication, that those rights
which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into
the hands of the General Government, and were consequently
insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have
ever heard against the admission of a bill of rights into this
systemrn; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I have
attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last
clause of the fourth resolution.
02
This clause of the fourth resolution became, in time, the Ninth
Amendment, and read initially in Madison's draft as follows:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution,
made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as
to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the
people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitu-
tion; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as in-
serted merely for greater caution.0 3
The final form of the Ninth Amendment is essentially a shorter
version of this provision: "The enumeration in the Constitution of
certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people."'
Madison's assertions that the judiciary would prevent legisla-
tive usurpation and guard constitutional rights together with his
view that the Constitution secures both enumerated and
unenumerated liberties reveal that his position on the judicial
power was essentially the same as Hamilton's. Neither position was
tied to specific constitutional language but gave the Court consid-
erable discretion to eliminate oppressive laws and regulations.
Perhaps more than any other provision, the Ninth Amend-
ment discloses the intended constitutional relationship between
governor and governee. The original Constitution did not grant
the federal government authority to abridge the people's liberties,
protect rights, whether or not enumerated.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 435.
104 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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whether identified or not, except when so provided therein. The
fights specifically protected in the original Constitution must have
been those of greatest concern to the Framers. They expected that
the judiciary would secure these few specified rights as well as the
greater number they did not specify. The Framers of the Bill of
Rights followed the same approach. Under the pressures generated
in the ratification proceedings and subsequently, they specified the
rights they considered of greatest concern. Similarly, they antic-
ipated the judiciary would safeguard these, as well as those not
named. The Ninth Amendment was the means they used for the
latter purpose. Without this Amendment, unenumerated rights
might not be protected, and freedom would have been less secure
than under the original Constitution, which safeguarded both
specified and unspecified liberties.
The powers of the judiciary are vast but not unlimited. "[I]n
questions of power, then, let no more be heard of confidence in
man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Con-
stitution . *...""' No chain is placed on the judiciary's veto pow-
er over the actions of the legislature and executive, but strong
chains otherwise exist on this branch as follows:
1. Congress has the power to determine the number of Justic-
es of the Supreme Court.
2. Congress controls the compensation of the Justices which
cannot be diminished while in office.
3. The President, with the concurrence of the Senate, ap-
points all Justices of the Supreme Court and other federal judges.
4. Congress has the power to establish all courts in the feder-
al system other than the Supreme Court.
5. Article III, Section 2, confines the judicial power to actual
cases and controversies, as enumerated, arising between adverse
litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction.
6. Article III, Section 2, sets forth and limits the original juris-
diction of the Supreme Court.
7. Article III, Section 2, authorizes the Supreme Court to have
appellate jurisdiction in all other cases "with such exceptions, and
under such regulations as the Congress shall make." In the only
case to date interpreting this clause, the U.S. Supreme Court up-
held Congress's removal in 1867 of its appellate jurisdiction in
cases of habeas corpus.'
105 ETHELBERT D. WARFIELD, THE KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS OF 1798, at 158 (2d ed.
1894) (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
106 Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). Scholars have expressed doubt
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8. Congress can impeach judges for "treason, bribery, or other
high crimes and misdemeanors." Otherwise they are entitled to
serve for life.
9. Separation of powers restricts the judiciary solely to nega-
tive powers over legislation and regulation; it has no authority to
impose affirmative mandates."0 7
A. The Legitimacy of Judicial Review
The argument has been made that judicial review is not legiti-
mate because it is nowhere authorized in the Constitution. My
response is that judicial review is inherent in a separatist govern-
ment and does not require enumeration. Indeed, as previously set
forth, it was the fear of legislative excesses and finality that largely
led to the separation of powers. Friedrich Hayek wrote that "it
must indeed seem curious that the need for courts which could
declare laws unconstitutional should ever have been ques-
tioned.""0 ' As Chief Justice Marshall asserted, to allow Congress
to be the judge of the constitutionality of its own acts "would be
giving to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence, with the
same breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow
limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may
be passed at pleasure."
Whatever remained of it, the argument that judicial review is
not constitutionally authorized was demolished with the ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The first sentence of Section'l of
this Amendment was adopted specifically to overcome the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott."' This decision ruled
that persons of African descent were not eligible to obtain state or
about McCardles vitality as a precedent today. See Beckel, What's Wrong With Nixon's Busing
Bills?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 22, 1972, at 19, 21.
107 "[O]ur cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer ,no af-
firmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life,
liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individu-
al." DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). "Al-
though the liberty protected by the Due Process Clauses affords protection against unwar-
ranted government interference . .. ., it does not confer an entitlement to such [govern-
mental aid] as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom." Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980); see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); SIEGAN,
supra note 1, at 304-17. Contra Plyler v. Doe, 475 U.S. 202 (1982); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
108 F~iEDpRCH A. HAYEK, THE CONSrTmON OF LIBERIY 187 (1978).
109 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
110 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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federal citizenship. While some members of the Thirty-Ninth Con-
gress, which framed the Amendment, sought to curtail judicial
review, no such action was taken notwithstanding the strong feel-
ings in the nation that the Supreme Court had seriously erred in
Dred Scott.
Members of Congress who participated in the debates on the
Fourteenth Amendment generally assumed that the Amendment
would be subject to judicial review of the same character that
already existed. Thus, Senator Jacob Howard who introduced the
measure in the U.S. Senate stated that a prior judicial interpreta-
tion of the meaning of privileges and immunities gives "some
intimation of what probably will be the opinion of the judicia-
ry.
" I I I
The second sentence of Section 1 contains the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, all of which greatly increased the Constitution's guar-
antee of liberties, effectively according the Supreme Court much
greater power than it previously possessed to monitor and invali-
date state legislation. The fact that the Thirty-Ninth Congress
considered the review power and did nothing to limit it, but actu-
ally enlarged it by adopting the proposed Fourteenth Amendment,
is persuasive evidence that the power was constructively approved
by the Congress sitting as a constitution-making body. Likewise,
the ratification conventions might have rejected the Amendment
for this reason but none did. The Framers of and the State con-
ventions that ratified the original constitution may not have com-
prehended the potential power of the Supreme Court, but the
Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly did.
Strictly construed, separation of powers relates only to the
three branches of the federal government and has no application
to the states. Assuming that the separation of powers principle
mandates judicial review over federal legislation, what requires use
of such power with respect to state legislation? In Fletcher v. Peck
(1810), Terrett v. Taylor (1915), and Wilkinson v. Taylor (1829), all
to be discussed in part III, the early Supreme Court either by rule
or dicta asserted supremacy of the U.S. Supreme Court over op-
pressive state legislation. Doubts about the propriety of such judi-
cial practices were resolved with the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868. Section 1 was intended to provide citizens
with the same protections against the states that they possessed
111 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866).
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against the federal government. Much legal literature is devoted to
the interpretation of these clauses, and this article will make only
brief reference to their meaning.
My conclusion about the objectives of Section 1 is based on
the debates on the Amendment by the Thirty-Ninth Congress. The
most important participants in these debates were Congressman
John Bingham of Ohio, the principle author of the second sen-
tence of Section 1; Senator Jacob Howard, who introduced the
proposed Amendment in the U.S. Senate; and Representative
Thadeus Stevens, who presented it to the House of Representa-
tives.
Bingham explained Section J as follows:
There was a want hitherto, and there remains a want now, in
the Constitution of our country, which the proposed
amendment will supply. What is that?- It is the power in the
people, the whole people of the United States, by express au-
thority of the Constitution to do that by congressional enact-
ment which hitherto they have not had the power to do, and
have never even 'attempted to do; that is, to protect by national
law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the
Republic and the inborn rights of every person within its juris-
diction whenever the same shall be abridged or denied by the
unconstitutional acts of any State.
Allow me, Mr. Speaker, in passing, to say that this amend-
ment takes from no State any right that ever pertained to it.
No State ever had the right, under the forms of law or other-
wise, to deny to any freeman the equal protection of the laws
or to abridge the privileges or immunities of any citizen of the
Republic, although many of them have assumed and exercised
the power, and that without remedy.1
2
The Ohio representative defined the term "privileges and
immunities" appearing in Article IV, Section 2, which states "the
Citizens of each state shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immu-
nities in the several states," in a speech he had previously deliv-
ered: "[C]itizens of the United States . . . are entitled to all of the
privileges and immunities ... amongst which are the rights of life
and liberty and property, and their due protection in the enjoy-
ment thereof by law .... ""
In his speeches, Bingham used the term "inborn rights" to
112 Id. at 2542.
113 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859).
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mean natural rights, and included all other guaranteed rights
within the term "privileges and immunities.""' Senator Howard,
114 Bingham (whom Justice Hugo Black referred to as the James Madison of the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment, Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74 (1947)
(Black, J., dissenting)) articulated his views on the issues with which the three major
guarantees of Section 1 are concerned in speeches he presented before Congress in 1857
and 1859. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. 135 (1857); CONG. GLOBE, 35th
Cong., 2d Sess. 981 (1859). His later addresses to the Thirty-ninth Congress reveal simi-
larity in position. Bingham customarily viewed privileges and immunities and due process
in natural rights terminology, each as insulating human freedom from government op-
pression. In his 1857 speech, he defended the power of Congress to control slavery in
the Territories, while in 1859 he attacked Oregon's attempt at statehood because it
barred freed negroes and mulattoes from settling there or holding real property and
making contracts within Oregon.
Unlike the contemporary interpretation, Bingham construed the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause in Article IV, Section 2, as guaranteeing fundamental rights; these were,
he contended, natural or inherent liberties of citizens of the United States that were in-
tended to be secure from violation by the states. As a strong believer in natural rights,
'he maintained a distinction between them and political rights, relating the former to
safeguarding of life, liberty, and property. Natural rights were insulated from the majority,
whereas political rights were its product. The following are excerpts from his two speech-
es relating to privileges and immunities:
I deny that any State may exclude a law abiding citizen of the United States
from coming within its Territory, or abiding therein, or acquiring and enjoying
property therein, or from the enjoyment therein of the "privileges and immuni-
ties" of a citizen of the United States . . . . [Pursuant to Article IV, Section 2,
the] citizens of each State, all the citizens of each State, being citizens of the
United States, shall be entitled to "all privileges and immunities of citizens in
the several States." Not to the rights and immunities of the several States; not to
those constitutional rights and immunities which result exclusively from State
authority or State legislation; but to "all privileges and immunities" of citizens of
the United States in the several States. There is an ellipsis in the language em-
ployed in the Constitution, but its meaning is self-evident that it is "the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of the United States in the several States" that
it guaranties [sic] . . . . All free persons, then, born and domiciled in any State
of the Union, are citizens of the United States; and, although not equal in re-
spect of political rights, are equal in respect of natural rights. Allow me, sir, to
disarm prejudice and silence the demagogue cry of "negro suffrage," and "negro
political equality," by saying, that no sane man very seriously proposed political
equality to all, for the reason that it is impossible. Political rights are conven-
tional, not natural; limited, not universal; and are, in fact, exercised only by the
majority of the qualified electors of any State, and by the minority only nominal-
ly.
CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d sess. 984-85 (1859).
His due process orientation was of the same character. According to Bingham, the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment secures natural rights of all persons, re-
quires equal treatment by the law, and comprehends the highest priority for ownership.
Note his statement that no one shall be deprived of property "against his consent," a
stronger affirmation of property rights than contemplated in the Fifth Amendment, which




after quotingJustice Bushrod Washington's broad definition of the
privileges and immunities provision in Article IV,' interpreted
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as follows:
To these privileges and immunities [as set forth by Justice
Washington], whatever they may be-for they are not and can-
[N]atural or inherent rights, which belong to all men irrespective of all conven-
tional regulations, are by this constitution guarantied [sic] by the broad and
comprehensive word "person," as contradistinguished from the limited term citi-
zen-as in the fifth article of amendments, guarding those sacred rights which
are as universal and indestructible as the human race, that "no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property but by due process of law, nor shall private
property be taken without just compensation.
Id. at 983.
Who . . . will be bold enough to deny that all persons are equally entitled to
the enjoyment of the rights of life and liberty and property, and that no one
should be deprived of life or liberty, but as punishment for a crime; nor of his
property, against his consent and without due compensation?
Id. at 985.
It must be apparent that the absolute equality of all, and the equal protection
of each, are principles of our Constitution, which ought to be observed and en-
forced in the organization and admission of new States. The Constitution pro-
vides, as we have seen, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or proper-
ty, without due process of law. It makes no distinction either on account of
complexion or birth-it secures these rights to all persons within its exclusive
jurisdiction. This is equality. It protects not only life and liberty, but also prop-
erty, the product of labor. It contemplates that no man shall be wrongfully de-
prived of the fruit of his toil any more than of his life.
CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. 140 (1857).
Delivered in oratorical style, the following passage from a speech in 1866 urging
adoption of his early version" of Section 1 reveals Bingham's commitment to a natural
rights perspective holding due process to embody the highest reaches of justice:
Representatives, to you I appeal, that hereafter, by your act and the approval of
the loyal people of this country, every man in every State of the Union, in ac-
cordance with the written words of your Constitution, may, by the national law,
be secured in the equal protection of his personal rights. Your Constitution pro-
vides that no man, no matter what his color, no matter beneath what sky he
may have been born, no matter in what disastrous conflict or by what tyrannical
hand his liberty may have been cloven down, no matter how poor, no matter
how friendless, no matter how ignorant, shall be deprived of life or liberty or
property without due process of law-law in its highest sense, that liw which is
the perfection of human reason, and which is impartial, equal, exact justice; that
justice which requires that every man shall have his right; that justice which is
the highest duty of nations as it is the imperishable attribute of the God of
nations.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1094 (1866).
115 See infta notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
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not be fully defined in their entire extent and precise na-
ture-to these should be added the personal rights guarantied
[sic] and secured by the first eight amendments of the Con-
stitution; such as the freedom of speech and of the press; the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for a redress of grievances, a right appertaining to
each and all the people; the right to keep and to bear arms;
the right to be exempted from the quartering of soldiers in a
house without the consent of the owner; the right to be ex-
empt from unreasonable searches and seizures, and from any
search or seizure except by virtue of a warrant issued upon a
formal oath or affidavit; the right of an accused person to be
informed of the nature of the accusation against him, and his
right to be tried by an impartial jury of the vicinage; and also
the right to be secure against excessive bail and against cruel
and unusual punishments.
Now, sir, here is a mass of privileges, immunities, and
rights, some of them secured by the second section of the
fourth article of the Constitution, which I have recited, some
by the first eight amendments of the Constitution .... The
great object of the first section of this amendment is, therefore,
to restrain the power of the States and compel them at all
times to respect these great fundamental guarantees.'
Representative Stevens asserted that Section 1 applied
protections identified in the Declaration of Independence and
contained in the Constitution to the states.
The first section prohibits the States from abridging the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or
unlawfully depriving them of life, liberty, or property, or of
denying to any person within their jurisdiction the "equal"
protection of the laws.
I can hardly believe that any person can be found who
will not admit that every one of these provisions is just. They
are all asserted, in some form or other, in our DECLARATION
or organic law. But the Constitution limits only the action of
Congress and is not a limitation on the States. This amend-
ment supplies that defect, and allows Congress to correct the
unjust legislation of the States .... 7
Inasmuch as there was no serious disagreement in the debates
of the Thirty-ninth Congress among the Amendment's proponents
116 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866).
117 Id. at 2459.
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about the meanings given by Bingham, Howard, and Stevens to
Section 1, the foregoing excerpts can be regarded as reasonably
accurate interpretations. The debates also disclose that Blackstone
and Kent were the most authoritative legal commentators for the
Thirty-ninth Congress, further evidencing a strong perspective in
that Congress to secure strongly and broadly the protection of
liberty. The conclusion is warranted that the purpose of Section 1
was to accord citizens of the United States the same protections
from the state governments that they enjoyed from the central
government."'
III. EARLY JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON THE JUDICIAL,
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT LIBERTIES
Let us now consider judicial practices subsequent to the ratifi-
cation of the original Constitution. If the judiciary were confined
to protecting enumerated liberties, its members would have en-
joyed considerable leisure. Only a small number of liberties are
protected in the original Constitution. The federal government
was limited in power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, to levy
taxes, to pass bills of attainder or ex post facto laws; jury trials
were required in all criminal matters, usually to be held within the
state where committed; treason was defined and its punishment
confined, and no religious test was required as a qualification for
any office under the United States government. No other personal
guarantees were provided.
However, as previously discussed, the absence of personal
protections was not regarded as a decisive factor in determining
the authority of the proposed government. According to James
Madison, the Constitution would never have been ratified if the
people believed that all unstated liberties were totally under the
control of the federal government." 9
According to the Federalists, the proposed national govern-
ment was one of limited and enumerated powers; it possessed only
those powers specifically vested in it. Theophilus Parsons of Massa-
chusetts, a leading Federalist, who was later to become Chief Jus-
tice of Massachusetts, asserted that the Antifederalist fears of a
powerful national government were groundless since "[n]o pow-
118 See BERNARD H. SIEGAN, THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSTITUTION 41-93 (1987).
119 3 FARRAND'S REPORTS, supra note 49, at 435 (Letter No. CCCXXXI from James
Madison to Judge Roane (Sept. 2, 1819)).
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er . . . was given to Congress to infringe on any one of the natu-
ral rights of the people by this Constitution; and, should they
attempt it without constitutional authority, the act would be a
nullity and could not be enforced."'2 0 Madison agreed: "[E]very
power not granted thereby remains with the people, and at their
will."'
2 '
The Federalists contended that the national government was
so limited in power that a bill of rights was unnecessary. More-
over, they contended that an enumeration of specific rights might
be harmful because it would imply the existence of power where
there was none, and because it might not list all rights that were
protected, to the detriment of those omitted. In The Federalist No.
84, Alexander Hamilton argued against any need for including a
bill of rights in the constitution. He asserted that the proposed
document was intended to regulate not personal and private con-
cerns, but rather, the nation's general political interests. Under
the Constitution, "the people surrender nothing; and as they re-
tain everything they have no need of particular reservations.""
Therefore, a bill of rights was superfluous. Such a declaration
might even be dangerous, Hamilton thought, because it would
contain various exceptions of powers that were not conferred, and
to this extent would furnish a "colorable pretext" for claiming
more than was granted-possibly by those disposed to usurpation.
"For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no
power to do?"' Indeed, for Hamilton, the Constitution is a bill
of rights:2 4 Congress has no authority to oppress the people,
and the judiciary is obligated to annul measures that do this.
By not including a bill of rights, the Framers entrusted the
judiciary with the giant responsibility of preserving liberty. In The
Federalist No. 78, Hamilton described the functions of three
branches with particular focus on the powers of and restraints on
the judiciary:
The executive not only dispenses the honors but holds the
sword of the community. The legislature not only commands
the purse but prescribes the rules by which the duties and
rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on
120 WOOD, supra note 16, at 538.
121 3 ELuOT'S DEBATES, supra note 39, at 620.
122 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
123 Id. at 513.
124 Id. at 515.
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the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the
purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of
the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may
truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the
executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments."1
The ratification arguments over the protecti6n of press free-
dom provide an illustration of the function ihe judiciary would
perform in securing liberties. Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No.
84 that there was no need to be concerned about securing press
freedom, inasmuch as the Constitution does not grant the govern-
ment any power to restrain it. 26 Does this mean, then, that as
far as the national government is concerned, freedom of the press
is absolute, and not subject to any restraint? James Wilson ex-
plained during the ratification debates that freedom of the press
was subject to the powers of government under the common law,
which were then considerable." In other words, the national
government had no power to diminish freedom- of the press as
the term was defined under the common law.
From this example, it is apparent that the judiciary would
have a large role in defining and protecting freedom, not an un-
usual role for judges at the time of the framing of the Constitu-
tion. In that period, common law tradition espoused the progres-
sive enlargement of the people's liberties. In applying the com-
mon law, judges changed it continually pursuant to new under-
standings and conditions. From the earliest years of the English
state, judges and parliament created and steadily expanded com-
mon law protections. As an example, at one time, only the meager
rudiments of criminal procedure were required; by Blackstone's
day, however, "absolute rights" to life, liberty, and property were
acknowledged.
When the Constitution was framed, the judiciary was highly
regarded as a guardian of individual rights. Hamilton praised the
American judiciary: "The benefits of the integrity and moderation
of the judiciary have already been felt in more States than one;
125 THE FEDERAusT No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
126 THE FMERAusr No. 84, at 513-14 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
127 PENNsyLvANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787-1788, at 308-09 (John Bach
McMaster & Frederick D. Stone eds., 1988).
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and though they may have displeased those whose sinister expecta-
tions they may have disappointed, they must have commanded the
esteem and applause of all the virtuous and disinterested.""2 For
many Americans, the unwritten English constitution, which consist-
ed principally of common law rights, provided a great measure of
human freedom. As historian Gordon S. Wood has put it, "what
made their Revolution seem so unusual [was that] they revolted
not against the English constitution but on behalf of it.""
Judicial review arrived at the federal level with Chief Justice
John Marshall's unanimous opinion in Marbuiy v. Madison."s
Marshall declared that the Court had the power to invalidate a
congressional statute that violated the terms of the Constitution.
Marshall applied customary rules of statutory construction to the
Constitution, just as if he were reviewing a legislative act. As such,
once he resolved the issue of judicial review, there was nothing
extraordinary about his method of interpreting the constitutional
provision in question.
However, another approach to constitutional construction
already existed. Some state courts reviewed the validity of legisla-
tion on the basis of natural and common law principles.' In
1798, Justice Samuel Chase presented this theory of constitutional
government in Calder v. Bull5 2 The theory was consistent with a
view of government that was then not uncommon-that a legisla-
ture was devoid of authority to deprive people of their natural
rights.
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a State Legislature,
or that it is absolute and without controul; although its authori-
ty should not be expressly restrained by the Constitution, or
fundamental law, of the State. The people of the United States
erected their Constitutions, or forms of government, to estab-
lish justice, to promote the general welfare, to secure the bless-
ings of liberty, and to protect their persons and property from
violence. The purposes for which men enter into society will
determine the nature and terms of the social compact; and as
they are the foundation of the legislative power, they will de-
128 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
129 WOOD, supra note 16, at 10.
130 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
131 See 2 WILLIAM CROssKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 938-75 (1953); HAINES,
supra note 82, at 89-112; SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDIcIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION 13-44 (1990).
132 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
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cide what are the proper objects of it: The nature, and ends of
legislative power will limit the exercise of it. ... There are acts
which the Federal, or State, Legislature cannot do, without ex-,
ceeding their authority. There are certain vital principles in
our free Republican governments, which will determine and
over-rule an appar[e]nt and flagrant abuse of legislative pow-
er; ... An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law)
contrary to the great first principles of the social compact,
cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authori-
ty... A law'that punished a citizen for an innocent ac-
tion ... ; a law that destroys, or impairs, the lawful private
contracts of citizens; a law that makes a man a Judge in his
own cause; or a law that takes property from A and gives it to
B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a
Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be
presumed that they have done it. The genius, the nature, and
the spirit, of our State Governments, amount to a prohibition
of such acts of legislation; and the general principles of law
and reason forbid them.1
3
Chase tied down the constitutional protections to the purpos-
es for which legislatures are created," seemingly a smaller limi-
tation on the legislature than natural rights would be although
some might well say the two are essentially the same. In the same
case, Justice Iredell wrote an opinion rejecting Chase's position
that a legislative act against natural justice is void. According to
Iredell, only an act of the legislature that exceeds its "marked and
settled boundaries" is void. This debate between Chase and Iredell
has continued among other Justices and commentators. 5 The
United States today is one of the most free countries in the world
largely because it has protected individual rights far beyond the
limitations that Iredell sought to place on it. To this extent, the
Framers' objective of confining government power has been
'achieved.
In Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance (1795),'" Justice William
Paterson, who had been a delegate to the Constitutional Conven-
tion, displayed a perspective similar to that of Chase.
[T]he right of acquiring and possessing property, and having it
133 Id. at 387-88 (1798).
134 See LAURwNcE H. TmBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 428-29 (1978).
135 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480, 507 (1965) (majority opinion of
Douglas, J., and dissenting opinion of Black, J.).
136 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795).
19951
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable
rights of man .... The preservation of property then is the
primary object of the social compact, and, by the late Constitu-
tion of Pennsylvania, was made a fundamental law .... The
legislature, therefore, had no authority to make an act divesting
one citizen of his freehold, and vesting it in another, without a
just compensation. It is inconsistent with the principles of rea-
son, justice, and moral rectitude; it is incompatible with the
comfort, peace, and happiness of mankind; it is contrary to the
principles of social alliance in every free government; and last-
ly, it is contrary both to the letter and spirit of the [Pennsylva-
nia] Constitution. In short, it is what every one would think
unreasonable and unjust in his own case.'
While referring to the Pennsylvania Constitution, Patterson's
emphasis was on natural law principles. According to this opinion,
constitutional protections can be determined by considering the
language of a constitution or the tenets of natural law. In this
case, Patterson seems to have applied the text as a secondary
means to secure a liberty.
Thus with the decision in Marbuiy v. Madison, two theories of
interpretation existed when legislation was challenged as being un-
constitutional. First, the judiciary was supposed to annul laws or
regulations contrary to the meaning of constitutional provisions,
and second, the judiciary could strike down oppressive legislation
(that is, violations of natural rights or of the social compact em-
bodied in the Constitution) without reference to constitutional
text. Marbury is an example of the first power. Marshall ruled that
Congress could not supplement the original jurisdiction accorded
the Supreme Court by the Constitution, and therefore, the statuto-
ry provision authorizing the Court to entertain mandamus suits as
an original matter was invalid. Calder and Van Home's Lessee are
examples of the second power.
The Marshall court applied both theories in Fletcher v. Peck'
to overturn a Georgia law canceling purchasers' title to millions of
acres of land in what is now most of Alabama and Mississippi.
This land had been bought in good faith from grantors who had
acquired it through legislative corruption. Marshall combined the
alternate grounds for decisionmaking by holding that the law in
question was oppressive as well as a violation of the Contracts
137 Id. at 310 (1795).




It is, then, the unanimous opinion of the Court, that, in
this case, the estate having passed into the hands of a purchas-
er for a valuable consideration, without notice, the State of
Georgia was restrained, either by general principles which are
common to our free institutions, or by the particular provisions
- of the Constitution of the United States, from passing a law
whereby the estate of the plaintiff in the premises so purchased
could be constitutionally and legally impaired and rendered
null and void. 1 9
It may well be doubted whether the nature of society and
of government does not prescribe some limits to the legislative
power; and, if any be prescribed, where are they to be found,
if the property of an individual, fairly and honestly acquired,
may be seized without compensation.
To the legislature all legislative power is granted; but the
question, whether the act of transferring the property of an
individual to the public, be in the nature of a legislative power,
is well worthy of serious reflection ....
In ruling on the contracts issue, Marshall interpreted the
Contracts Clause by examining its language and meaning, conclud-
ing that it prohibited the passage of the challenged statute.
Justice Johnson (a Jeffersonian and therefore presumably not
disposed to accept Marshall's Federalist outlook) concurred despite
his inability to find a provision in the Constitution denying a state
power to revoke its own land grants. "But I do it, on a general
principle, on the reason and nature of things: a principle which
will impose laws even on the Deity."141
In Terrett v. Taylor," Justice Joseph Story invoked the spirit
and letter of the Constitution, principles of natural justice, and
the fundamental laws of all free governments to strike down a
Virginia statute that would have deprived the Episcopal Church of
its property. Infringing on the church's rights would be "utterly
inconsistent with a great and fundamental principle of a republi-
can government."1
Chief Justice Marshall, who had joined in Story's opinion,
139 Id. at 139.
140 Id. at 135-36.
141 Id. at 143 (Johnson, J., concurring).
142 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
143 Id. at 50-51.
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spelled out his views on natural law many years later. Dissenting in
Ogden v. Saunders,'" which involved the validity of state bankrupt-
cy laws, Marshall asserted that the Contracts Clause limits a state
from restricting freedom of contract. Marshall strongly asserted his
belief that the right of contract is natural.
[I]ndividuals do not derive from government their right to
contract, but bring that right with them into society; that obli-
gation is not conferred on contracts by positive law, but is in-
trinsic, and is conferred by the act of the parties. This results
from the right which every man retains to acquire property, to
dispose of that property according to his own judgment, and to
pledge himself for a future act. These rights are not given by
society, but are brought into it. The right of coercion is neces-
sarily surrendered to government, and this surrender imposes
on government the correlative duty of furnishing a reme-
dy ....
This reasoning is, undoubtedly, much strengthened by the
authority of those writers on natural and national law, whose
opinions have been viewed with profound respect by the wisest
men of the present and of past ages.'45
Moreover, according to Marshall, the Framers of the Constitu-
tion were intimately acquainted with writings on natural law that
declare that contracts possess an original, intrinsic obligation not
given by government. Because of this knowledge, Marshall opined
that "[w] e must suppose, that the framers of our constitution took
the same view of the subject, and the language they have used
confirms this opinion."' Thus natural law was also a guide, if
not necessarily the paramount consideration, in constitutional
interpretation.
Subsequently, in Wilkinson v. Leland,4 the Supreme Court,
per Justice Story, asserted that the legislature was an inherently
limited body.
That government can scarcely be deemed to be free,
where the rights of property are left solely dependent upon the
will of a legislative body, without any restraint. The fundamen-
tal maxims of a free government seem to require, that the
rights of personal liberty and private property should be held
sacred. At least no court of justice in this country would be
144 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
145 Id. at 346-47 (Marshall, CJ., dissenting).
146 Id. at 354 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
147 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 (1829).
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warranted in assuming, that the power to violate and disregard
them; a power so repugnant to the common principles of jus-
tice and civil liberty lurked under any general grant of legis-
lative authority, or ought to be implied from any general ex-
pressions of the will of the people. The, people ought not to be
presumed to part with rights so vital to their security and well
being .... 148
Justice Bushrod Washington, while on circuit in 1823, attempt-
ed to import the natural rights doctrine into the Constitution by
way of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. In
Corfield v. Coryell,49 the first federal interpretation of the clause,
Washington held that the clause protects those privileges "which
are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the
citizens of all free governments."5 ' He declared the Federal Con-
stitution guarantees nonresidents' fundamental rights against en-
croachment by a state.'
Notwithstanding his natural rights position, many view Mar-
shall as a strong supporter of national authority because of his
decision in McCulloch v. Mayland' McCulloch permitted Con-
gress great discretion in adopting legislation that "is really calculat-
ed to effect any of the objects intrusted to the government."-'
In this decision, Marshall accorded more power to Congress than
the Framers intended it to have. Nevertheless, he held Congress
must justify its enactments under a standard of reasonableness:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
[C]onstitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are consti-
tutional."
The Chief Justice subsequently explained that Congress could
not "under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the
accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government."'M
Thus, Congress' enactments were valid only if they were legitimate,
appropriate, and related to their purpose. Similar criteria might
148 Id. at 657.
149 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
150 Id. at 551.
-151 Id.
152 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
153 Id. at 423.
154 Id. at 421 (footnote omitted).
155 Id. at 423.
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have been considered by Coke in determining "common right and
reason" and by Blackstone in evaluating "wanton or causeless"
restraints. Marshall rejected as illegitimate legislation for its own
sake, not otherwise sufficiently justified. In applying this standard,
however, Marshall gave much more deference to the legislature
than either Coke or Blackstone would have preferred.'
James Kent, the celebrated constitutional commentator and
New York Chancellor, followed Marshall and Story in upholding
natural law principles. In an opinion written in 1811 as Chancellor
of New York, he stated that judges were not to be confined by the
rights enumerated in constitutions:
Our constitutions do not admit the power assumed by the
Roman prince; and the principle we are considering [no retro-
active laws] is now to be regarded as sacred. It is not pretend-
ed that we have any express constitutional provision on the
subject; nor have we any for numerous other rights dear alike
to freedom and to justice.5 '
In his Commentaries on American Law (1826), Kent wrote that a
statute "affecting and changing vested rights is very generally con-
sidered in this country as founded on unconstitutional principles,
and consequently inoperative and void." By "unconstitutional,"
Kent did not mean contrary to the provisions of the document,
but rather, contrary to what he considered to be general limita-
tions implicit in all free governments-limitations based on natural
rights and the social compact.'58
In these observations, Kent was expressing views prominent
among jurists. According to the well-regarded constitutional schol-
ar Edward Corwin, during the initial period of federal constitution-
al history, which closed about 1830, leading judges and lawyers
accepted the ideas of natural rights and the social compact as
bases for constitutional decisions.'59 Professor J.A.C. Grant report-
ed that between 1816 and 1860, high or federal courts in New
York, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Georgia, Maryland, Arkansas,
and Iowa held or expressed the belief that natural justice required
156 A storm of protest erupted throughout the country against Marshall's opinion.
The critics contended that by giving the Congress great deference, Marshall had under-
mined states rights.
157 Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 505 (N.Y. 1811).
158 See PAUL BREsT & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERiAS 116 (1983).




that compensation be paid when private' property is taken for
public use.' 60
IV. CONTEMPORARY JUDICIAL DECISIONS EXPANDING FREEDOM
An examination of contemporary U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions protecting liberties reveals that like its predecessors, the
twentieth century court has engaged in two kinds of inquiry. First,
whether the law in question violates the language or meaning of a
specific term or provision of the Constitution, and second, wheth-
er the law is oppressive."' Chief Justice Marshall applied the first
inquiry- to determine constitutionality in Marbury and Justice Chase
relied on the second in Calder. "It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is," assert-
ed Marshall, which in Marbury meant interpreting constitutional
text and meaning.162 By contrast, Justice Chase did not feel
bound by the language of the Constitution. He believed that the
purposes for which men enter into society will determine the
limits of the legislative power, even if not 'expressed. The theory
that the legislature has the power to oppress the people, if not
expressly restrained, is both 'contrary' to reason and "a political
heresy, altogether inadmissible in our free republican govern-
ments."'"
These early views of the judicial responsibility have prevailed
throughout the Supreme Court's existence. By its rulings, dicta,
and practice, the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that its
obligation to preserve liberty requires it strike down laws that are
oppressive regardless of whether the Constitution's text requires
such action. Accordingly, the Court presently guarantees liberties
which are not enumerated and greatly expands the meaning of
enumerated liberties far beyond original understanding.
Consider the history of free expression in the United States.
Although noted for his support of free expression, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes held in 1907-that the c6nstitutional guarantees of
speech and press were quite limited.
[T]he main purpose of such constitutional protections is "to
160 J.A.C. Grant, The Natural Law Background of Due Process, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 56, 71-
81 (1931).
161 See supra note 107 and accompanying text with respect to positive constitutional
mandates.
162 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
163 Calder v. Bull 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388-89 (1798).
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prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as has been
practiced by other governments," and they do not prevent the
subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to
the public welfare. The preliminary freedom extends as well to
the false as to the true; the subsequent punishment may extend
as well to the true as to the false. This was the criminal law
apart from statute in most cases if not in all.M
Holmes cited Blackstone in support of his ruling. Blackstone mod-
estly construed freedom of the press.
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a
free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon
publications, and in freedom from censure from criminal mat-
ter when published. Every free man has an undoubted right to
lay what sentiments he pleases before the public. To forbid this
is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what
is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the conse-
quences of his own temerity."
Holmes interpreted the First Amendment on the basis of the
common law definition of free press at the time the amendment
was ratified. He followed an accepted form of inquiry for deter-
mining the meaning of a law. Subsequently, he turned sharply
from this approach and interpreted the First Amendment by rea-
soning based on the importance of the marketplace of ideas both
to the individual and to society. This interpretation resulted in the
celebrated "clear and present danger" test. There is little connec-
tion between the First Amendment's textual meaning and the
clear and present danger test.
The question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the sub-
stantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a ques-
tion of proximity and degree."
Once the Court adopted the clear and present danger test, it
rarely looked back to original meaning, but continued instead to
broaden the Constitution's protection of expression. In 1964, the
Court threw out the common law of libel and slander as it existed
164 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (citations omitted).
165 4 WILLIAM BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52 (emphasis added).
166 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see Robert H. Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.. 1 (1971) for discussion of the
relation between the Framers' views and those of Justice Brandeis on free expression.
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during and for a long time after constitutional ratification. It sub-
stituted instead a modified interpretation of defamation intended
to encourage public debate that is "uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open" even if it meant at times the publication without penalty of
untruths and sharp attacks on government and public officials.167
Although the language of the First Amendment applies only to
Congress, the Court effectively substitutes the word "government"
in its place and applies the protection as against all the branches
of state and federal government.1"
Expression is protected unless it falls within the parameters of
the Chaplinsky test.
Allowing the broadesi scope to the language and purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the
right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-those which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immedi-
ate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any bene-
fit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality."
Under the Brandenberg test, the successor to the clear and
present danger test, the advocacy of force and violence is not
necessarily wrongful under the First Amendment.
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
167 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
168 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). This is the Pen-
tagon Papers Case in which the executive department sought to obtain an injunction
from the judicial department. Congress had not enacted any legislation relating to the
matter.
169 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); see R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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is likely to incite or produce such action.'7"
The controversial flag burning case illustrates the interpretation of
these rules. The Supreme Court found that the malicious burning
of the American flag to express condemnation of and displeasure
with American society was not "imminent lawless action" and
therefore constituted protected expression.1
7
1
There is little relationship between original understanding and
contemporary interpretation of the expression guarantees of the
First Amendment. But, of course, according to Justice Chase and
others, constitutional language was not decisive in the protection
society should accord critical liberties. The U.S. Supreme Court
continues to subscribe to this position and, as the foregoing exam-
ples of expression illustrate, secures liberties nowhere mentioned
or originally secured in the Constitution.
Without basis in original meaning and notwithstanding the
furor raised in many quarters, the Court secured a pregnant
woman's right to an abortion as part of the right of privacy, on
the general theory that government's prohibition of this operation
is oppressive. The Court found that a pregnant woman might
experience severe mental detriment if she was not permitted to
abort her fetus. In providing protection for the liberty of mo-
bility, which the Court has referred to as the right to travel, the
Court asserted: "We have no occasion to ascribe the source of this
right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provi-
sion."" The Court protected the right because it "occupies a po-
sition fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union." 74 A
person denied this liberty suffers oppression.
Gender classification is similar to this situtation. When the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, women enjoyed far
less civil rights than men. Neither the equal protection clause of
that amendment nor any other clause was intended to apply to
gender. Beginning in 1972 with its decision in Reed v. Reed, the
Supreme Court has provided women substantial protection against
170 Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). This rule protects speech advo-
cating forcible overthrow of government, a position some scholars consider as without
basis in original understanding. See Bork, supra note 166, at 31.
171 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
172 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). But see Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (substantially increasing the power of a state
to limit abortion).




preferential treatment for men.75 "To withstand constitutional
challenge .... classifications by gender must serve important gov-
ernmental objectives and must be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives."176 This standard is without basis
in the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment yet con-
trols current interpretations.
The Supreme Court also has protected numerous other liber-
ties such as the right of association, the right to be presumed
innocent, the right to be judged by a standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in a criminal trial, and the right to attend crimi-
nal trials-all of which are not mentioned in the Constitution.
The Court has created a very high standard of review, referred to
as strict scrutiny, applicable to certain rights and suspect classifica-
tions, that is very difficult for legislatures to satisfy. It has struck
down laws that limit property ownership, which is mentioned, on
the basis that the laws were unjust or oppressive. 77
Clearly, the practice of the Supreme Court has~been to pro-
vide protection for liberty frequently without regard to constitu-
tional language and original meaning. The practice is consistent
with the objective of judicial review under the separation of pow-
ers; that is, to void measures of the legislature or executive that
are oppressive to the people. Were the judiciary to be confined to
textual meaning, the libertarian objectives of the separation of
powers would only be partially achieved.
The quintessential case on modem rights jurisprudence is
Griswold v. Connecticu' in which the Supreme Court found a
right of privacy in the Constitution. This case concerned the viola-
tion by Griswold and others of a Connecticut statute prohibiting
any person from assisting another in the use of any drug, medici-
nal article, or instrument for the purpose of preventing concep-
tion. Justice William Douglas sought to write an opinion confined
to constitutional text and meaning. He condemned prior jurispru-
175 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
176 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
177 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). Conceding
that early constitutional theorists did not believe the takings clause embraced regulation
of property, Justice Scalia, for the majority, relied on an "historical compact recorded in
the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture." Id. at 2900. The
concept of inverse condemnation enforced under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment is difficult to reconcile with the original understanding of that clause. See United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE LJ. 1077 (1993).
178 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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dence in the economic area that he insisted violated constitutional
restraints on the judiciary and operated to make the Court a su-
per legislature, determining the wisdom, need, and propriety of
economic and social laws. Interestingly, history discloses that in
this opinion, Douglas opened the door to a jurisprudence pro-
tecting sexual activity with far less basis in original understanding
than the one he attacked.
The problem presented was that the Connecticut law involved
the intimate relation of husband and wife, to which there was no
constitutional liberty directly applicable. Douglas observed that a
number of rights were judicially protected even though they were
not mentioned in the Constitution. In each of these instances, the
Court secured the rights as implicitly protected under an enumer-
ated liberty. These decisions suggest, Douglas concluded, that
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras "formed
by emanations from those guarantees that give them life and sub-
stance."179 Thus, while each provide particular protections, the
First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments also create zones of
privacy that would include sexual privacy.
The right of association [is] contained in the penumbra of the
First Amendment .... The Third Amendment in its prohibi-
tion against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time
of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of
that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the
"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables
the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may
not force him to surrender to his detriment .... 180
Douglas proceeded to cite to the Ninth Amendment as providing
the Court with discretion to protect unenumerated rights. In his
opinion, Douglas protected a liberty that the Framers had not
included in their list, but which "concerns a relationship lying
within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental consti-
tutional guarantees[,]""' and was consistent with their constitu-
tional aspirations.
We deal with the right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights--older than our political parties, older than our school
179 Id. at 484.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 485.
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system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sa-
cred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not caus-
es; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty,
not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions."
It was a ruling that could have been penned by Justice Chase.
Other concurring Justices applied the Ninth Amendment and the
due process provisions to reach the same result. Justice Black
dissented, accusing Douglas and other of his colleagues of under-
mining constitutional law by inyoking natural law concepts exterior
to the Constitution. "I like my privacy as well as the next one, but
I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a right
to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provi-
sion."" He cited and quoted Justice Iredell's opinion in Calder
in support of his position."M History reveals that the only major
constitutional area in which the Iredell-Black position has prevailed
is economics.
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S CONTEMPORARY RECORD
ON ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Three U.S. Supreme Court decisions covering the period from
1938 to 1993 present the Court's current position on the protec-
tion of economic liberties: United States v. Carolene Products Co.,"
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 86 and FCC v. Beach
Communications, Inc.'
A. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.
The complainants in Beach Communications were operators of
SMATV Cable Services. An SMATV system typically receives a sig-
nal from a satellite through a small satellite dish located on a
rooftop, and then transmits the signal by wire to units within a
building or complex of buildings.
In providing for the regulation of cable television facilities,
Congress drew a distinction between facilities that do not use
182 Id. at 486.
183 Id. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting).
184 Id. at 525 (Black, J., dissenting).
185 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
186 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
187 113 S. C. 2096 (1993).
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public rights-of-way and serve separately owned or managed build-
ings and those that do not use public rights-of-way and serve one
or more buildings under common ownership or management.
Cable facilities in the latter category are exempt from regulation.
Beach Communications presented the question whether there was
sufficient reason to justify this distinction for purposes of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The complainants, who
serviced separately owned or managed buildings, asserted that
they, like those who were exempt, were entitled to engage freely
in this legitimate business activity. Since the statutory classification
involved economic liberties and neither implicated a suspect class
nor infringed upon fundamental constitutional rights, the courts
considering the matter applied the minimal scrutiny test under
which the classification would be upheld if any reasonably conceiv-
able facts could support it.
Merely stating this rule suggests the answer; it is difficult to
imagine a classification that would not succeed under such a
broad, subjective test. Nevertheless, two members of a three judge
panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals concluded: "We see no
'rational basis' for the distinction . . . ."" The concurring judge
was not similarly troubled. He contended that his colleagues
showed "too little reluctance to overturn complex economic legis-
lation under the minimal rational-basis test."
89
Under the rational-basis test, the reasons need not be persua-
sive, just conceivable. Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court,
Justice Thomas was not impressed with the Circuit Court majority's
limited imagination, and the Court reversed. "Whether the posited
reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated Congress
is 'constitutionally irrelevant."'1 9' Thus, Thomas thought that the
exception was based on the small size of single owner or managed
complexes. When counsel asserted that an exception on the basis
of size, which prior regulations contained, was not included in the
legislation being challenged, Justice Thomas replied that it did not
make any difference what the legislators actually contemplated, the
critical question was whether the legislators might conceivably have
so intended.'
Thomas's second conceivable basis for the statutory distinction
188 Beach Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 959 F.2d 975, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
189 Id. at 988.
190 113 S. Ct. at 2103 (quoting United States RLR. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.
166, 179 (1980)).
191 Id. at 2103.
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related to the "monopoly power" the provider of cable TV for
separately owned and managed buildings would obtain by the ini-
tial installation of a dish which would allow additional buildings to
be connected for the small cost of the cable, an arrangement not
applicable for single owned or managed developments. Whether
the difference is sufficient to warrant regulation is a matter that
merits considerable inquiry, which would not be required under
the minimal scrutiny test. Frequently, regulation leads to price
increases. Regardless, for constitutional purposes, the distinction
may be based entirely on rational speculation. "Congress had to
draw the line somewhere . . ." and, therefore, wrote Thomas, "the
precise coordinates of the resulting legislative judgment [are]
virtually unreviewable, since the legislature must be allowed leeway
to approach a perceived problem incrementally." 92
B. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.
This case involved a 1977 Minnesota law prohibiting the retail
sale of milk in plastic, nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers. The
sale of milk in paperboard cartons was not affected. The
legislature's articulated purposes were to promote resource conser-
vation, ease solid waste disposal problems, and conserve energy.
Plastic bottle manufacturers and retailers sued to have the law de-
clared unconstitutional on the basis that it denied them the liberty
to produce and distribute plastic milk bottles, a legitimate item of
commerce.19
3
Applying its version of the minimal scrutiny test, the trial
court initially considered whether the law serves important govern-
ment objectives. Legislatures impose economic regulation for one
or both of the following reasons: first, to cause the economic
system to function better-that is, to remedy or remove the excess-
es or limitations of the private market; second, to secure an eco-
nomic advantage for a person, corporation, or group by the elimi-
nation or obstruction of competing businesses, occupations, prod-
ucts, or services.
A law passed to achieve the second reason serves private inter-
ests and not important governmental objectives. In addition to
denying liberty to some person or group, such a law also reduces
192 Id. at 2102.
193 Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, No. 423258 (Dist. Ct., County of Ramsey
Apr. 5, 1978).
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production and competition, and thereby increases costs, which
disadvantages the vast majority while benefiting only a few. It takes
from A and gives to B for the benefit of B. In the Minnesota
plastic bottle case, the state trial court found that contrary to the
stated purposes the "actual basis for the act" was to promote the
interests of certain parts of the local dairy industry and the pulp-
wood industry, and to harm the interests of other segments of the
dairy industry and the plastics industry. It held the law unconstitu-
tional.
However, suppose the court finds that the law seeks to in-
crease competition and productivity, to eliminate waste, or to im-
prove the environment. These are important governmental objec-
tives. The next issue is whether the law will substantially achieve
these objectives-the means-ends test. The Minnesota Supreme
Court assumed that the articulated purposes motivated the legisla-
ture, but held that the law would not achieve these purposes."
Therefore, the restraint on liberty was without purpose and uncon-
stitutional.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. It found that the Minneso-
ta Supreme Court wrongfully "did not reverse on the basis of...
[the District Court's] patent violation of principles governing ratio-
nality analysis under the Equal Protection Clause." 95 The trial
court had not been sufficiently deferential to the legislature. The
Supreme Court held that the determining factor under the mini-
mal review test is whether the legislative means is rationally related
to the achievement of the statutory purposes. The parties had
agreed at the final level of litigation that the legislature had truth-
fully articulated its purposes.
The state identified four reasons why the distinction between
the plastic and nonplastic nonreturnables was rationally related to
the articulated statutory purposes. The Supreme Court stated that
if any one of the four substantiates the state's claim, the Act must
be sustained.
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the invalidation of the
law, rejecting on an empirical basis the stated reasons. The
legislature's conclusions were "speculative and illusory," not sensi-
ble, or totally wrong. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reversed
each ruling on the ground that it is not the function of the court
to substitute its evaluation of legislative facts for that of the legisla-
194 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 289 N.W.2d 79 (1979).




Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated:
Respondents apparently have not challenged the theoretical
connection between a ban on plastic nonreturnables and the
purposes articulated by the legislature; instead, they have ar-
gued that there is no empirical connection between the two.
They produced impressive supporting evidence at trial to prove
that the probable consequences of the ban on plastic nonre-
turnable milk containers will be to deplete natural resources,
exacerbate solid waste disposal problems, and waste energy, be-
cause consumers unable to purchase milk in plastic containers
will turn to paperboard milk cartons, allegedly a more environ-
mentally hanfiful product.
But states are not required to convince the courts of the
correctness of their legislative judgments. Rather, "those chal-
lenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that
the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently
based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the
governmental decisionmaker."'96
C. United States v. Carolene Products Co.
The United States Filled Milk Act prohibited the shipment in
interstate commerce of any product, consisting of skimmed milk
and a fat or oil other than milk fat, which resembled milk or
cream. The defendant manufactured and distributed "Milnut," a
compound of condensed skimmed milk and coconut oil and was
indicted under the Act. on the ground that this product "is an
adulterated article of food, injurious to the public health."9 ' The
statute was directed at compounds which although safe for con-
sumption, might be substituted for milk, denying the consumer
the nutrients contained in milk. Congress rejected efforts to limit
the legislation solely to requiring that the containers fully disclose
their contents.
In an analysis of the Filled Milk Act, Professor Geoffrey Miller
considers it "an utterly unprincipled example of special interest
legislation."'98 He writes that proponents of the legislation were
various farmer associations: breed groups, county, state, and na-
196 Id. at 463-64 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979)).
197 Congressional committees concluded the product facilitates fraud on the public
because it would be confused with evaporated milk.
198 Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Stoy of Carolene Products, 1987 SUP. Cr. REV. 397, 398.
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tional political organizations; dairy newspapers; agricultural colleg-
es and universities; granges; and dairy promotional organizations.
Broadly speaking, these members of the "dairy industry" were
threatened by the low price for the filled milk products compared
with pure dairy products. The purpose of the statute was to drive
small producers out of the market, which in the main it accom-
plished, disadvantaging also working and poor people deprived of
a healthful, nutritious and low cost food."°
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the act on the basis of a
newly created standard of minimal scrutiny applicable in economic
matters under which a legislature will almost inevitably prevail, as
previously described." The decision reversed the much higher
standards of review for economic regulation that had been in
effect since 1897."1 Ironically, the occasion for the application of
this new standard was one where judicial review under a separa-
tion system was most appropriate: The Congress, responding to
politically powerful forces, had deprived people of their liberty to
manufacture and distribute a legitimate article of commerce. The
decision also introduced into constitutional law jurisprudence the
celebrated footnote four which provided a new and highly contro-
versial theory of constitutional interpretation."2
According to footnote four, the extent to which legislation
should be subject to judicial scrutiny depends on the legislative re-
lief available to the complainants. Those who are denied mean-
ingful access to the political process and have little realistic chance
of influencing lawmakers should be accorded preferential treat-
ment by the judiciary. If a group has a reasonable opportunity to
avail itself of the electoral and legislative processes to accomplish
change in its behalf, it does not require judicial aid.
According to the footnote, racial, religious, and some ethnic
groups are discrete and insular minorities requiring judicial inter-
vention on their behalf. Producers and sellers do not come within
this category. However, in a representative government premised
on majority rule, many people engaged in economic activities do
not have the resources to protect their interests either at the bal-
lot box or in the legislative halls. They too can be victims of per-
199 Id. at 399.
200 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938); see also supra
text accompanying note 5.
201 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
202 SeeJOHN H. ELY, DEMoCRAcY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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verse, arbitrary, and capricious measures. However, under the
separation system, the judiciary's role is to protect liberty, regard-
less of whether the victim is rich or poor, influential or powerless.
The filled-milk case concerned a denial of liberty with little
resulting benefits to society. The defendant was the producer of a
new product, cheaper than, and a substitute for, milk and there-
fore a serious competitive threat to the farm and dairy interests.
In time, however, these interests lost their persuasiveness with the
federal judiciary. In 1972, a federal district court invalidated a
filled-milk statute as arbitrary and capricious, and in the absence
of any contrary ruling by a higher court, Milnut type products may
now be marketed freely.
2°3
VI. APPLYING THE SEPARATION DOCTRINE TO ECONOMIC LIBERTIES
English and American political history and experience made it
inevitable that the U.S. Constitution would substantially limit the
power of political majorities. English and American law was greatly
influenced by the ideas of Locke, Coke, and Blackstone," all of
whom believed that government is limited in its sovereignty over
the individual. The ideas of natural rights and limited government
prevailed in intellectual circles, and among those who signed the
Declaration of Independence and framed the U.S. Constitution.
The framers of constitutions in America-both state and feder-
al-sought to achieve a system in which the people are supreme
except that they must always defer to individuals' exercise of their
liberties. The Federal Framers created a limited government which
was dependent on constitutional authority to exercise its will.
The early Americans faced with this dilemma of liberty and
authority sought to create a government that would be powerful
enough to protect them but not powerful enough to oppress
them. They rejected the parliamentary system since it vested al-
most all governmental powers in an elected body, the House of
Commons. They believed that when unlimited power is lodged
either in a king or a legislature, regardless of how well-intentioned
either may be, there is considerable risk that it will be exercised
tyrannically.
The Constitution's framers consequently imposed strong limi-
tations on government, to a degree that had rarely existed in any
203 Milnot Co. v. Richardson, 350 F. Supp. 221 (S.D. 111. 1972). The product in ques-
tion is now produced and distributed in the United States.
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nation. The government was to be divided and confined and the
people's liberties were to be guaranteed. Separation of powers
meant that the legislature would share its rule making powers with
the other branches. From the prospective of a free government,
this is the paramount issue.
The U.S. Supreme Court has in large measure implemented
this constitutional scheme. In rulings, dicta, and practice, the
Court has protected a wide variety of liberties from legislative
invasion. It has, on the whole, sought to protect the Constitution's
express terms and provisions from violation. In addition, it has
often interpreted its constitutional obligation as mandating the
guarantee of liberties not identified in the document. This has
occurred in two situations: First, it has protected liberties nowhere
mentioned in the Constitution. Second, it has protected activities
related to enumerated liberties that cannot be construed as includ-
ed in the original understanding (e.g., clear and present danger
test, malicious flag burning, commercial speech, strong protections
for people accused of criminal activity). In the absence of the
protection accorded unstated liberties, the power of the legislature
over human activities would be unlimited in many areas.
Why then are economic liberties treated differently? A large
portion of the American society is engaged in economic activity.
Under current law, producers and distributors of goods and servic-
es have little legal security against majority rule; government has
near absolute power to bar entry into a business, to limit the
output of the business and to establish arbitrary or capricious rules
under which its owners or managers must operate the business.
The constitutional promise of freedom does not exist for people
aggrieved by these rules; for them the state or federal government
consists of two branches-a most deplorable outcome.
Separation of powers accords an aggrieved person the right to
seek judicial redress against arbitrary and capricious legislative
impairments of liberty. This opportunity is available to those who
exercise speech, press, religion, assembly, property, travel, and
privacy. Why not for entrepreneurs or would-be-entrepreneurs
seeking to exercise the liberties of the commercial marketplace?
That no specified liberty protects this right-which is assumed in
this article-is not relevant since the same holds true for many
other liberties that are protected. The critical issue for a nation
dedicated to "secure the blessings of liberty"2 is whether the
204 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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government has acted excessively.
It is argued that economic liberty is not worthy of constitu-
tional protection. Understandably, not all human activities merit
constitutional support. However, to maintain this position with
respect to economic liberties requires evidence that great priorities
among the most common liberties should exist. This is a difficult
position to sustain. When government arbitrarily prohibits or im-
pedes economic activity, it deprives great numbers of people of
their right to act freely in their own interest. Such policy inhibits
self-realization, personal satisfaction and personal development,
which are surely prize goals of human life. One must wonder why
so common and ordinary a liberty is removed from the boundaries
of a document that is dedicated to liberty. In the three decisions
discussed in the prior section, persons were deprived of their liber-
ties without accompanying benefits to society.
Establishing the priority of liberties is a political judgment
involving the distribution of benefits on a subjective basis. This is
a matter of political policy and not judicial administration. The
judiciary possesses no political power. It has little authority to
extend its protections as it deems desirable or necessary. Nor does
it have the power to favor certain groups over others, as occurs
when it protects those who produce and distribute ideas but not
those who produce and distribute goods and services. Those who
framed and those who ratified the Constitution never intended to
grant positive powers to this branch of government. The judicial
branch, declared Hamilton, would have no influence over either
the sword or the purse, and no direction either of the strength or
of the wealth of the society."5 The courts of justice were to be
no more than the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legis-
lative encroachments."' It is inconceivable that the judiciary was
given the power to excise from the Constitution, in whole or in
part, the fundamental principle of separation of powers.
Since there is no question that economic liberty is of great
importance to many people, the only basis for not preserving it
would be that it is detrimental to the welfare of the society. This
is a difficult position to take in the 1990s in view of the worldwide
rejection of Communism in large part because it forbad the exer-
cise of economic liberty. The great lesson of our times is that the
205 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
206 Id. at 469.
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forces of production, conservation, and creativity rest principally in
the freedom of the marketplace and not in the power of govern-
ment.
Because much welfare and regulatory legislation has proved
economically harmful, judicial review of such legislation serves the
pragmatic interests of society. During the substantive due process
years (prior to the Carolene Products case), opposition to judicial
review came largely from the left side of the political spectrum.
These critics demanded social reforms and income redistributions,
which could be effected only by Congress and the state legisla-
tures. They viewed the judiciary as a serious impediment to such
ends. What the reformers apparently did not comprehend was that
while judicial review would terminate some liberal measures, it
would also dispose of legislation favorable to wealthy and special-
interest groups. Although legislatures pass statutes intended to
help the disadvantaged, they also impose regulations that serve the
wealthy and special-interest groups at the expense of the poor.
Modem understanding of the regulatory processes reveal that
many of the most controversial opinions of the Supreme Court
during the substantive due process period (when economic liber-
ties were secured) were well founded in economic theory. A sub-
stantial number of economists would now accept the majority
opinions in Lochner,"' Adkins,"8 and New State Ice,2" as well as
the dissenting opinion in Nebbia,10 as expressing economically
reasonable positions, especially beneficial to the more disadvan-
taged members of society.
The more freedom in the marketplace, the more likely it will
better provide for the people. Contemporary economic studies
show that in the United States, government regulation of econom-
ic markets very often operates negatively. In my book, Economic
Liberties and the Constitution, I summarized fifty-three studies of
government regulation, by more than sixty individual and institu-
tional researchers, which have appeared in the most prestigious
scholarly literature. These studies show that although every regula-
tion accomplishes some purpose, the great majority fail a cost-
benefit analysis. Indicative of their conclusions, the vast bulk of
these scholars favor either total or substantial deregulation of the
207 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
208 Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
209 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).




As revealed in these studies, much regulation has resulted in
the reduction of economic efficiency, misallocation of resources,
and redistribution of income from the consumer to the regulated
group. Considered as a whole, regulations seriously limit this
nation's productivity and output. A common finding in these stud-
ies is that the regulation of concern raises prices, first, by reducing
competition, and second, by imposing a variety of unnecessary re-
quirements on producers and sellers that increase cost. People of
average and lesser income, those least able to afford higher prices,
are the most adversely affected.
As the subsequent pages will disclose, there are many explana-
tions for the failures of regulations. Thus, a proposed regulation
may be based on the best intention and information but this does
not mean that in its final form it will serve the public interest. For
regulatory proposals to become law, the legislative and administra-
tive authorities must adopt necessary statutes and rules to imple-
ment them. However, the record of the political process in this
respect has not been very good. The perfect plan is often quite
imperfect by the time it emerges from the pressures and compro-
mises of the legislative process on the local or higher government
level, and it might be ravaged still more as administered. It is
possible that the courts may lay some or much of the plan to rest.
Consider the comments on regulation by Professor Ronald
Coase, 1991 Nobel Laureate in economics, who was for a long
time the editor of the Journal of Law -& Economics. Over the years,
the journal published numerous studies on economic regulation,
and Coase concluded:
The main lesson to be drawn from these studies is clear;
they all tend to suggest that the regulation is either ineffective
or that, when it has a noticeable impact, on balance the effect
is bad, so that consumers obtain a worse product or a higher-
priced product or both as a result of the regulation. Indeed,
this result is found so uniformly as to create a puzzle; one
would expect to find in all these studies at least some govern-
ment programs that do more good than harm.
2 12
Professor Coase believes that, in theory at least, there is no
reason why government regulation cannot improve on market
211 SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 283-303.
212 Ronald Coase, Economists and Public Policy, in LARGE CORPORATIONS IN A CHANGING
SociETY 184 (J. Fred Weston ed., 1974).
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processes. He states, however, "My puzzle is to explain why these
occasions seem to be so rare, if not non-existent."
213
The experience of government regulation in the United States
reveals the great difficulty of maintaining economic freedoms in
democratic societies. As the Minnesota plastic bottle case reveals,
economic regulation emanates chiefly from two different sources.
The first source is those people who demand the passage of laws
to remedy what they see as problems in the economic system.
They are motivated by ideological or more general public interest
reasons. Members of this group do not directly benefit from the
laws they propose or favor. The second source of economic regula-
tion is those individuals and corporations who seek regulation in
their own self-interest. Most of the people in this group are in
business, trades, or professions. They want regulations imposed to
obtain more income for themselves.
This second group is engaged in rent seeking, a term used by
economists to identify actions by individuals and interest groups
intended to change public policy with respect to taxes, spending,
and regulation in a manner that will redistribute more income to
them. In addition to obstructing the market, rent seeking requires
the employment of lawyers and lobbyists in activities that do not
advance productive activity.214
The second group accounts for a great deal of regula-
tion-perhaps most of it. In a democratic society, legislators are
highly receptive to the demands of their constituents. As a result,
a relatively small number of persons seeking to obtain monetary
gains have considerable political opportunity to do so. U.S. Circuit
Court Judge Richard Posner has suggested that the lawmaking pro-
cess creates a market for legislation in which politicians "sell" legis-
lative protection to those who could help their electoral prospects
with money or votes or both."5
Professor Michael Granfield has likened the legislature to a
general store whose inventory includes monopolies, preferences,
and concessions. The politicians sell these goods, as any astute
store owner would, to the group offering the highest price. The
arrangement does not necessarily include bribery or any other
illegal activity. It may simply involve a legal contribution or a
213 Id.
214 JAMES D. GwARTNEY & RICHARD L. STROUP, ECONOMICS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
CHOICE 94, 743, 753-55 (1989).
215 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 405 (1977).
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promise of votes.15
The process that leads to legislation benefitting comparatively
few people is not difficult to understand. Those who would be
helped monetarily by laws have the incentive to wage a strong
lobbying effort, whereas those who would bear the cost without
sharing the benefits frequently do not have sufficient personal
stake to fight for their position. The concentration of benefits
provides a special interest group with an incentive for creating a
narrow political lobby, whose small size makes organizing relatively
easy.
On the other side, a larger number of citizens are involved;
they are often widely dispersed and frequently have little or no
knowledge of the proposed laws or the probable effects. Further,
the costs of the legislation are spread so that few persons suffer
very much, which limits incentive to organize. As a consequence,
the costs of spending measures, subsidies, and special economic
preferences are passed along to an often unknowing and uncom-
plaining public.
Yet, considered as a whole, many studies disclose that regula-
tion in the United States is very costly. A recent study estimates
that federal regulation may cost American taxpayers an additional
$400-500 billion annually over the costs the government disclosed
in the national budget. This amounts to an average of $4000-5000
per household."'
These figures do not separate what might be termed "neces-
sary" and "unnecessary" regulations. Even assuming a considerable
amount of these costs is for "necessary" regulatioris, experience in
this area reveals that a huge portion is being spent as a result of
government controls that do not protect or benefit people's lives
and property. It should also be noted that perhaps the most ex-
pensive of "unnecessary" controls are those which operate to inhib-
it the human skills that advance society.
Given the incentives of the political process, the well-being of
property owners and entrepreneurs can be precarious. Reform
216 Michael Granfield, Changing Industries and Economic Performance, in COASE, supra
note 212, at 164.
217 THOMAS D. HOPKINS, COST OF REGULATION (Rochester Institute of Technology
Working Paper 1991); see ROBERT E. LnTAN & WILLiAM D. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL
REGULATION (1983); MURRAY L. WEIDENBAUM, THE COSTS OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION
OF BUSINESS, A STUDY FOR THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES (Apr. 10, 1978); Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regula-
tion: Review and Synthesis, 8 YALE J. REG. 233 (1991).
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groups who reject or distrust market mechanisms and various
interest groups who seek monetary gain have considerable oppor-
tunity to achieve their shared goals.
The protection of owners and entrepreneurs from the power
and might of these special economic interests can only be
achieved through the judicial process. These persons are in a very
realistic sense discrete and insular minorities with little power in
the political process. The separation of powers principle is intend-
ed to protect the liberties of all people, surely including producers
and distributors of goods and services.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the early part of this
century that protected economic liberties under either the Due
Process or Equal Protection Clause is often referred to as discred-
ited by jurists and legal commentators. Lochner v. New Yor 218 is
cited as a prime example of judicial abuse in cases of that charac-
ter. Considering the many contemporary decisions that uphold
unenumerated liberties, the Court's decision in that case can hard-
ly be considered as illegitimate. The statute in issue was one
passed by New York's legislature limiting to sixty the number of
hours a baker could "be required or permitted" to work each
week, with a maximum of ten hours a day. The Supreme Court
struck down the law as violative of the freedom of contract se-
cured by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Many
critics concluded that the Lochner decision operated harshly to
prevent workers from obtaining shorter working hours, ignoring its
total impact. They apparently did not recognize that reducing
working hours often proportionally lessens the amount of pay that
the worker receives.
Bakers who sought more income could work elsewhere and
continue to have a long work day, possibly under equally difficult
conditions. Bakers who worked less time as a result of the law
would receive a reduction in their earnings. They would then find
it more difficult to obtain food, medication, housing, clothing, and
other necessities for themselves and their families. Potentially,
shorter hours could result in greater health problems than those
related to long work hours.
The legislative solution of reduced working hours is not neces-
sarily a desirable outcome, as the Lochner critics insist. Understand-
ably, for justices concerned about maintaining freedom of con-
tract, the state did not show sufficient justification for the law.
218 198 U.S. 45 (.1905).
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Which is to be preferred, longer hours and higher wages or short-
er hours and lower wages? A reasonable basis for deciding this
question is to favor the result consistent with liberty of the market-
place.
Market conditions in time reduced the work day in bakeries.
The average length of the working day for bakery employees de-
clined nationally from about ten hours in 1909, to nine hours in
1914, to eight hours in 1919, but increased slightly in 1921.219 A
survey of working hours for union workers in various industries
shows that on the average, union bakers worked 64.5 hours per
week in 1890, 59.3 in 1905, 52.5 in 1915, and 47.8 in 1926.220
The 1936 decision Nebbia v. New York began the slide in judi-
cial protection of economic liberties. New York criminalized the
sale of milk below nine cents a quart in retail stores. Nebbia, a
small store owner in Rochester, sold two bottles of milk and a loaf
of bread for eighteen cents and was subsequently convicted of a
misdemeanor for violating the milk control law. Maximum prices
were not then prescribed, nor was production in any way limited.
In Nebbia, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a five to four decision,
upheld the conviction against a challenge that it violated the
seller's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses."
In his dissent, Justice McReynolds sought to identify a grocer's
liberty of contract with the public interest:
Not only does the statute interfere arbitrarily with the
rights of the little grocer to conduct his business according to
standards long accepted-complete destruction may follow; but
it takes away the liberty of twelve million consumers to buy a
necessity of life in an open market. It imposes direct and arbi-
trary burdens upon those already seriously impoverished with
the alleged immediate design of affording special benefits to
others. To him with less than nine cents it says-You cannot
procure a quart of milk from the grocer although he is anx-
ious to accept what you can pay and the demands of your
household are urgent! A superabundance; but no child can
purchase from a willing storekeeper below the figure appointed
by three men at headquartersl And this is true although the
storekeeper himself may have bought from a willing producer
219 HAZEL KYRK & JOSEPH S. DAvis, THE AMERICAN BAKING INDUSTRY 1849-1923 AS
SHOWN IN THE CENSUS REPORTS 61 (1925).
220 PAUL H. DOUGLAS, REAL WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES 1890-1926, at 112 (1966).
221 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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at half that rate and must sell quickly or lose his stock through
deterioration. The fanciful scheme is to protect the farmer
against undue exactions by prescribing the price at which milk
disposed of by him at will may be resold!m
In all probability, such sentiments reflected the views of James
Madison and many of his colleagues at the Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1787. Their adoption of limited government and rejection
of majoritarian government reveals their strong belief that liberty
rather than authority best serves the interests of society.
Nobel Laureate Friedrich Hayek has written very persuasively
about the benefits and rewards of human freedom. For Hayek,
liberty is the foremost concern of constitutionalism. He regards
liberty as beneficial to the individual and the community and as
essential to the advancement and progress of society. The benefits
an individual derives from freedom are largely the result of the
uses - of freedom by others, most of which the individual could
never avail himself of. Therefore, the freedom that a person can
himself exercise is not necessarily most important.
What is important is not what freedom I personally would like
to exercise but what freedom some person may need in order
to do things beneficial to society. This freedom we can assure
to the unknown person only by giving it to all....
. . . If we proceeded on the assumption that only the
exercises of freedom that the majority will practice are impor-
tant, we would be certain to create a stagnant society with all
the characteristic of unfreedom." s
Maximizing liberty will lead to the greatest societal gains and ad-
vances:
Most scientists realize that we cannot plan the advance of
knowledge, that in the voyage into the unknown-which is
what research is-we are in great measure dependent on the
vagaries of individual genius and of circumstance, and that
scientific advance, like a new idea that will spring up in a sin-
gle mind, will be the result of a combination of conceptions,
habits, and circumstances brought to one person by society, the
result as much of lucky accidents as of systematic effort. 4
History strongly supports Hayek's thesis. Because of fewer
regulations, the number and variety of products and services are
222 Id. at 557-58 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
223 HAYEK, supra note 108, at 32.
224 Id. at 33.
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much more plentiful in capitalist than in communist nations. All
the current and former communist states are economically less
developed because of restrictions on liberty. Under communism,
all firms are government owned, and the operation of each is
directed by national planners and other officials. A firm's manag-
ers are supposed to do little more than follow orders. Neither they
nor the government regulators have much incentive to innovate or
improve the firm's products or operations.
As a result, communist companies continue to make virtually
the same products every year, while capitalist producers are contin-
ually improving the quality (and quantity) of their output. Partici-
pants in the capitalist marketplace, as Professor Kirzner reminds
us, are engaged in an incessant race to get or keep ahead of one
another-and to be ahead always means "to be offering the most
attractive opportunities to other market participants."2 It fol-
lows, therefore, that any regulations that inhibit individual initia-
tive and creativity impede advancement, whether in the market-
place of ideas or of goods and services.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution created a limited gov-
ernment which relied on freedom as the principle means for soci-
etal advancement and progress. In the separation and confinement
of government poweis and the guarantees of liberties, the Framers
embodied the libertarian ideas of Locke, Coke, and Blackstone
and the principles espoused in the Declaration of Independence.
These ideas and principles compel the judiciary to preserve and
protect economic rights. In failing to protect these constitutional
liberties of investors and entrepreneurs, the judiciary has not ful-
filled its constitutional duty.2
6
225 ISRAEL M. KiRZNER, COMPETmON AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 20 (1973).
226 An appropriate level of review for economic regulation would be similar to the
heightened scrutiny currently applied in property regulation cases. See Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); see also BERNARD H. SIEGAN, DRAFrNG A CONSTITUTON
FOR A NATION OR REPUBLIC EMERGING INTO FREEDOM 37-43 (2d ed. 1994); SIEGAN, supra
note 1, at 318-331.
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